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PART I
LAW, STRATEGY AND NAVAL OFFICERS
CHAPTER I

THE ANATOMY OF LEGAL STRATEGY
IN ECONOMIC WARFARE
A. PARTICIPANTS, TECHNIQUES AND CONDITIONS OF
ACTION IN ECONOMIC WARFARE
In the context of naval interest here emphasized, "econon1ic \varfare" describes an intense disturbance either of the flow of material
resources among people or the use of these material resources by
them. The disturbance is coercively oriented and state directed
against an adversary to diminish its power.
Economic warfare is distinguished from "military warfare," mentioned frequently in this book. Military warfare· describes an intense
disturbance of human resources, usually by death, injury or imprisonment. The two forms of \Yarfare are not mutually exclusive. The
preemption of human resources-such as forced labor-or the disorganization of labor may be described as "economic" \Yarfare or "military" warfare in some contexts. Likewise, strategic bombing from
aircraft or by ballistic missiles, in tended to destroy both material
and human resources, may be vie\ved as economic or military warfare
depending upon the emphasis in context.
A state is a territorially organized and based community. Naval
officers usually serve as state representatives. Economic warfare by
international organizations tends to be planned and executed through
state ins6tutions.
"The flow of material resources" includes the discovery and circulation of these among the people of any communities involved in an
economic warfare confrontation. "Circulation" includes the transport
of resources. "Use" includes the processes by \vhich values are produced from material resources. In most instances, these processes
involve initial production of "'vealth" fron1 material resources, with
wealth then being used to attain other values. The intense disturbances resulting from economic warfare thus usually are associated
with "wealth" and the phrase "wealth flow and use~' will be employed
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in this book to refer to the processes-·wealth and other-which are
"disturbed" in "economic warfare." However, the "\Vriter does not
intend by using these terms to exclude fro1n the ambit of "economic
"\varfare" disturbances such as interferences 'vith the transportation
of "\veapons and military equipment, materials not usually viewed as
"wealth" in a conventional sense.
Frequently wealth flo·w and use is disturbed in conflict dominated
by persuasive elements. Conflict of this nature is not here considered.
"Economic "\varfare" is used in this book to describe only those situations in "\vhich 'vealth disturbances are both int.ense and coercively
oriented.
Naval officers are demonstrably adept in persuasive techniques. The
naval service has long been familiar "\vith "diplomacy of the quarterdeck." 1 But naval officers are primarily specialists in violence. They
are likely to participate significantly as commanders or advisors in
economic "\Varfare "\vhen "\Vealth disturbances have a coercive edge.
Persuasion has its place in economic "\varfare; but persuasion figures
largely in the area of "legal strategy" incident to the execution of
economic warfare policies.
"Economic "\varfare" includes direction against an adversary. The
definition thus excludes inadvertent "\Vealth disturbances. However,
inadvertent collateral w·ealth disturbances often occur "\Vhen wealth
disturbances are directed; and the probable effects of these collateral
disturbances should be considered 'vhen economic "\varfare is planned
and executed.
Economic "Tarfare has been described by other "\"\Titers in various
"\vays. All co1nmentators upon the topic agree that economic "\varfare
involves the manipulation of material resources to affect the po,ver
of an adversary :-The ·wealth of the adversary may be decreased.
His use of "\Vealth may be impeded. His wealth may be radically
increased to induce confusion. The "\Vealth position of the value
manipulator or his ally may be enhanced.
But differences arise in the conflict situations and particular practices emphasized by these commentators. There are also variations
in the clarity 'vith which these commentators view economiq "\Yarfare
as "objective" or "goal" directed.
Some describe any coercive use of values by international organizations, states, corporations or natural persons as economic 'varfare
if disturbances in the distribution of "'vealth" and consequently of
"power" are significant. Others mnphasize the conflict situation.
Traditionalists-those "\Yho vie"- economic "\varfare as ending "\Yhen
1

See Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1118-1883

( 1912) , passim.
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military hostilities end-and also those writers 'vho concentrate
upon applications of physical violence-tend to regard economic
warfare simply as confined to techniques supporting military operations against an enemy. 2
Interest has been exhibited in recent years in coercive wealth practices intended to be used as substitutes for military violence. 3 An
expectation by these 'vriters is expressed or implied, perhaps unjustifiably, that such uses of coercive "~ealth practices may avoid or minimize the hazards of general 'var stemming from localized armed
conflict.
If one bro,vses extensively in 1naterials relevant to coercive 'vealth
practices, any wealth practice having detrimental effect upon soineone else can be found described by those sy1npathetic to the victim
as "economic warfare," while - those sympathetic to the "~ealth
manipulator, euphemistically, 'vill describe the same practice as an
"economic measure."
Each of these con11nentators describes accurately certain segments
of economic warfare. But none tend to deal 'vith economic 'varfare,
often because of the special context emphasized, in a broad policy
perspective.
These differences in emphasis suggest a dual relation of economic
warfare to other techniques designed to attain general state policy
objectives. Economic warfare may be waged in a primary or in a
secondary policy role.
If a strategist relies upon the projected effects of economic warfare
to secure a desired response from his adversary, he conducts economic
Medlicott, The Economic Blockade (Vol. I, 1952, Vol. II, 1959) is the most
detailed and valuable study with this emphasis. Volume I contains a survey of
prewar planning. The emphasis is upon British economic warfare operations
but much American material is included. See also, Gordon and Dangerfield,
'l'he Hidden Weapon, The Story of Economic Warfare (1947) ; Basch, The New
Economic Warfare (1941) ; .Jack, Studies in Economic Warfare (1940) ; Siney,
The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916 (1957). Good short accounts may
be found in 1\fcDougal and Feliciano, Lww and l.Iinimum World Public Order,
509-519 (1961) and Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 457-544 (2d
2

Ed., 1959).
3

See Welton, The Third World War: Trade and Industry-The New Battle(1959); Wu, Economic Warfare (1952). Liska, The New Statecraft
(1960) deals with economic pressure through foreign aid. Williams, Economic
Intelligence and Economic Warfare (Vol. XV, Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, 1952) emphasizes the importance of adequate intelligence in economic
warfare. Useful fragmentary treatments are Haas and Whiting, Dynamics of
International Relations, 233-242 (1956) ; Lincoln, Economics of National Security, 521-544 (2d Ed., 1954) ; McDougal and Feliciano, Law and l.linimum
World Public Order, 30-32 (1961) ; Strausz-Hupe & Possony, International
Relations, 532-561 (1950).
ground
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·warfare as a primary polz"cy device. If a strategist relies instead upon
the effects of other coercive or persuasive devices upon his adversary,
"\Vaging econo1nic "\Yarfare si1nply to support the device upon 'vhich
he principally relies, he conducts econo1nic "\Yarfare as a secondary
policy device. Economic "\Yarfare thus functions in a secondary policy
role "\Vhen waged to dj1ninish the resources of an enen1y subjected to
military violence as the principal sanction.
In the total policy spectrum of a. state at any given ti1ne economic
"\varfare may be "\vaged both as a primary and as a secondary policy
device. \Vhile the tendency is to employ econo1nic "\varfare in a
secondary policy role during 1nilitary hostilities, even in this context
examples of econo1nic "\varfare e1nployed in a primary policy role
usually can be discovered.
In some situations, as in an environment characterized by intermittent resorts to military violence, it may be difficult to determine
the precise policy role of economic. "\Varfare. The degree of reliance
upon economic "\Varfare shifts frequently depending upon the techniques a state prefers to attain its most important values. Ho,vever,
certain typical techniques have been associated 'vith economic "\Varfare in prima~y and secondary policy roles and identification of these
may assist in determining the degree of policy primacy attributed by
state policy makers to economic "\Varfare in a particular context.
I. Common Economic Warfare Techniques

\Vhen "Taging economic "\varfare as a primary policy device, strategists tend to use competi6ve techniques developed in private con1merce. Private co1nmercial techniques are adopted and e1nployed by
state institutions. Alternatively, private comn1ercial operations are
diverted to state ends.
An adversary may be harassed by 'vithdra "\Yals of gold or other
precious metals. These "\vithdra"\vals are a1nong the oldest economic
"\Varfare techniques. England, France and Holland 'vithdre"\v gold
from Spain in the 17th century by contraband trade 'vith Spanish
colonies. France hatched a plan in 1796 to coerce England by 'vithdrawing guineas from circulation.
States have counterfeited currency of an adversary to reduce the
purchasing po,ver of valid issues. Louis ICossuth, exiled in England,
had Hungarian florins printed by an Engljsh lithographer. Although
not counterfeits of florins issued by the de facto Hungarian government, the Kossuth florins ''ere intended to compete 'vith this valid
currency and reduce its purchasing po,Yer. 4 The Soviet Union ob4

See The Emperor of Austria v. Day and Kossuth, 3 DeGex, F. & J., 217

(1861).
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tained American plates used to print German occupation marks.
After World War II, the Western occupation zones were flooded with
excessive Soviet issues to obtain dollars from speculators, produce
inflation and impede reconstruction.
Tariffs have been favored economic ·weapons. Used defensively, a
tariff may be p1aced upon the goods of an adversary to force a higher
price in the market of the strategist. A tariff may also be used
offensively to destroy industries of an adversary. This was attempted
by Louis XIV in his tariff war against Holland in 1667.
Barriers may be raised to imports or exports or to both. A ustria
dislocated the Serbian economy in 1905 by a boycott on Serbian pigs
-a principal Serbian export. Embargoes frequently have been placed
upon export of goods from the embargoing state. The United States,
for example, imposed an embargo in 1807 upon American and foreign
shipping from United States ports. This was designed to deny to
France and England access to American resources in order to induce
respect by both of United States claims to freedom in sea commerce.
Trade cartel manipulations have been favored devices for economic
harassment. 5 Nazi Germany used its control over Zeiss in J ena,
which could influence by cartelization Bausch and Lomb in the
United States, to induce Bausch and Lomb to reject British and
French orders for military optical equipment prior to American
participation in World War II. 6 Research or production by an adversary may be blocked by cartel refusals to license patents or to
disclose information necessary to use them. 7 An adversary's industries
may be injured by cartelized price cutting ("dumping"); by buying
up critical materials ("preempting") ; or by withholding critical intermediate products ("hoarding").
When economic warfare is waged as a s-econdary policy device,
private competitive techniques, including cartel manipulations and
similar methods, may remain important policy features. But when
5

Useful general references are Berge, Cartels: Challenge to a Free World
(1944) ; Borkin and Welsh, Germany's Master Plan: The Story of Industrial
Offensive (1943) ·; Hexner, International Cartels (1946). For studies in special
areas, see Hexner, The International Steel Cartel (1943) ; Marx, International
Shipping Cartels (1953). Detailed materials concerning Nazi cartel operations
will be found in U.S. v. Krauch (I. G. Farben Case), VII, VIII, Trials of War
Criminals (1952) ; U.S. v. Krupp, IX Trials of War Criminals (1953) ; U.S. v.
Flick, VI Trials of War Criminals (1952) ; Nurenberg Military Tribunals. See
DuBois, The Devil's Chemist (1952j; Reimann, Patents tor Hitler (1942).
Modern cartelization patterns and regulations are described in Edwards,
Cartelization in Western Europe (1954) and Miller, Competition Cartels and
Their Regulation ( 1962) .
6
See Borkin and Welsh, Germany's Master Plan, 271-288 (1943).
7 See Reimann, Patents for Hitler ( 1942) .
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military force is the primary policy instrument, the most frequent
circumstance in 'vhich economic warfare 'viii be found in a secondary
policy role, private commercial techniques are overshadowed by devices to destroy the enemy's supplies, storage facilities and production. These devices include, typically, air and sea bombardment of
depots and shipping facilities, sabotage, and variations of blockade
to interdict the w·ater, land and air transportation of the adversary.
2. Protracted Harassment and Economic Sortie

Usually economic 'varfare is "raged in the form of protracted
harassment. The strategist gradually attrites the adversary's resources
to attain his objective.
Economic warfare by protracted harassment is effective in a secondary policy role. Blockades, embargoes and boycotts, often associated 'vith military hostilities, are typical harassing techniques.
Alternatively, and less frequently, economic "Tarfare is conducted
in the form of economic sort1~es. One of the best exa1n pies, seldom
recognized by those unacquainted 'vith economic warfare, was
mounted by Spain against Napoleon in 1802. The Spanish objective
'vas to force France to cede Louisiana to the United States. The objective was accomplished by Spanish 'vithdrawal of the right of
American citizens trading on the Mississippi to deposit goods at
N e'v Orleans pending ocean shipment, a right conferred by the
Treaty of San Lorenzo (Pinckney Treaty) of 1795.
3. Economic Sortie and the Louisiana Purchase

In 1800, Napoleon, in the Treaty of San Ildefonso, required Spain
to retrocede Louisiana to France. Napoleon planned to use Louisiana
as a source of food and naval stores to support a French Caribbean
coffee and sugar empire. The hub of this empire 'vas to be Santo
Domingo. France had acquired Santo Domingo in 1795. But by 1800,
the island had fallen under the s"ray of Toussaint L'Ouverture. A
necessary condition to execution of Napoleon's design was pacification of Santo Domingo by the French.
Because Santo Domingo had apparently slipped irretrievably from
French control during negotiations for the Treaty of San Ildefonso,
the Spanish did not suspect immediately the scope of Napoleon's
Caribbean plan. His plan embraced construction of the empire from
Spanish Caribbean colonies. These he would force Spain to disgorge
at his convenience.
Although Spain had acquired Louisiana from France in 1762, her
possession of the territory had never been secure. Louisiana was regarded by Spanish officials both as a wasting asset and as a probable
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victim to American expansion. France, in Louisiana might block an
American push into the Floridas or into the South,vest.
But when Napoleon con1mitted t\venty thousand men in an effort
to overthrow L'Ouverture in 1801 and squandered thousands of
reinforcements upon the expedition, the extent of his appetite for
Spanish colonies became painfully clear. Santo Domingo 'vould
serve as the naval base and Louisiana the supply depot for a rapid
extension of French Caribbean influence.
Relying upon the failure by Napoleon to secure recognition of the
Prince of Parma as l(ing of Tuscany, 'vhich he had agreed to do in
return for the retrocession of Louisiana, Spain refused to surrender
the territory. She prevailed in this bold position throughout 1802
principally because Napoleon's military expedition to take possession
was frozen into its Dutch harbors in the severe fall and winter of
that year.
The United States had expected to inherit Ne'v Orleans and its
environs when the grip of Spain finally faltered. Accordingly, in the
spring of 1802, negotiations commenced bet,veen Talleyrand and
Livingston for purchase by the United States of the French territory
recently acquired from Spain.
The Treaty of San Ildefonso, by which Spain retroceded Louisiana
to France in 1800, remained secret until 1801. The terms of the
treaty were then imperfectly revealed.
When Livingston commenced his negotiations 'vith Talleyrand,
he labored under the misapprehension that the Floridas, as well as
Louisiana, had been ceded to France. His defective state of information, coupled with the evasiveness of Talleyrand and the indecisiveness of Napoleon, caused the negotiations to be protracted inconclusively through the summer of 1802.
Spain appreciated her inability to hold Louisiana if the force
assembled by Napoleon 'vas dispatched to take the territory. On the
other hand, the difficulties of the French in Santo Domingo were
becoming notorious. Yell ow fever had 'veakened the French army,
slain its commander, and threatened the expedition with destruction.
The troops in· Holland might be diverted to Santo Domingo. Al-

though neither equipped for a Caribbean campaign nor immune to
yellow fever, the efforts of these troops, coupled 'vith those of the
French "immunes" on the island, might overcome the disorganized
and demoralized insurgents.
Spain was aware that Florida had been mentioned in the negotiations with Talleyrand. Napoleon, never the soul of honesty, might
sell the Floridas and coerce Spain to transfer them. A major bastion
to valued Cuba then would be lost.
The Spanish position 'vas an unenviable one. Nevertheless, Spain
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\Vas favored by Napoleon's financial strictures and by his deepening
despair over the Santo Domingan adventure. 8 The Americans in
Louisiana \Vould prove uncongenial neighbors. But Spain might lose
her Caribbean territories to N apo]eon unless that conqueror's dream
of empire, dependent upon his possession of Louisiana, finally could
be dispelled.
In October 1802, under these circumstances, Morales, Spanish Intendant in New Orleans, withdrew the "right of deposit," announcing
he did so upon his o\vn initiative. He was instructed to say this in
the secret Spanish order for the withdrawal. 9
The right of deposit was critical to the United States to permit
rapid development of its w·estern lands. American traders on the
Mississippi were inconvenienced and annoyed. Many believed N a poleon had ordered the withdrawal.
President Jefferson and the Congress responded with alacrity. The
President appointed Monroe as Minister Extraordinary to act with
Livingston. Congress appropriated funds for an intensification of
negotiations and for part payment of the contemplated purchase
price.
Dismayed by the fate of his Santo Domingan expedition, near
bankruptcy, and faced \vith a "·ar "~ith England, Napoleon was now
confronted with a threatened American seizure of New Orleans and
a possible Anglo-American alliance. It \vas simple common sense to
reap what advantage he could from the breached Treaty of San
Ildefonso and sell the Louisiana Territory to the United States.
A voiding constitutional obstacles to the acquisition of this unexpectedly large area, Jefferson advised his colleagues the less said
about the legal points involved the better.l 0 The United States took
possession of Louisiana after the French had held it for only twenty
days.
In the atmosphere of rejoicing over the cession: France because
she had the purchase price-\vhich Napoleon imprudently lavished
on landing craft to invade England; the United States because it
controlled the Mississippi and had new lands for its citizens to
exploit; the modest pleasure of Spain in eliminating the menace of
s Napoleon, brooding in his place of honor at a small soiree in January 1803,
burst out to the astonishment of the guests: "Dam'n sugar, dam'n coffee, dam'n
colonies." Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 96 (1955).
9 Misled by a smokescreen of Spanish entreaties not to sell the territory,
American historians wrote off the withdrawal as bungling by a colonial bureaucrat. Disclosure that withdrawal was pursuant to a Spanish order has not
eliminated the confusion. Pratt, op. cit., 92 (1955).
10 Latane, A History of American Foreign Policy, 110 (1934).
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Napoleon to its Caribbean possessions was obscure. This is a tribute
to the finesse of the Spanish action.
The seller ·was tactfully coerced-the buyer indelicately excited.
Tension was attenuated because Morales' order was rescinded when
the decisions to buy and sell were ma-de.
The Spanish plan required manipulation of t'vo legal features.
First was construction of the 'Treaty of San Ildefonso ( 1800). Spain
claimed Napoleon had breached the treaty. This gave Spain an argument for retaining Louisiana, set Napoleon "up for the kill," and
bought Spain time and space for maneuver. The right of deposit
would be moot if N e'v Orleans 'vas ceded to the United States.
The plan was based upon a shrewd analysis of the pressures upon
Napoleon, Jefferson and the United States Congress. The execution
was effective because of careful timing of withdrawal of the right of
deposit and its equally prompt restoration.
4. Principles of the Economic Sortie: Comparison With Elements
of Military Strategy

As used by Spain against Napoleon, the economic sortie typically
has been a form of economic warfare waged by weak against more
powerful states. Seldom 'vill these 'veaker states enjoy the resources
required for economic warfare by protracted harassment; nor can
they hazard the violent physical responses by their adversary which
protracted harassment tends to induce.
In the economic sortie, economic coercion creates psychical disequilibrium in the power elite of the adversary. Sir B. H. Liddell
Hart has described psychical disequilibrium as "the sense of being
trapped." 11
Strategy in military and economic warfare share this common
purpose. The strategist seeks to dislocate the value processes upon
which the power elite of the adversary relies. Thereby the psychical
equilibrium of this elite is disturbed so that its alternatives for
choice are narrowed to the area the strategist desires.

The Sense of "Entrapment"
A "sense o£ being trapped" springs £rom intuitive pessimism compounded by an induced belief that observed facts are unalterable.
The condition typically is temporary; and this requires continuing
action by the strategist to insure adherence by the target elite to the
coerced decisions. Military and economic warfare strategists must
play continually upon the twin keys of pessimism and observation.
The drive for personal security contributes to the conviction of a
po,ver elite, possessing maximum values within a group or the maxiu Liddell Hart, Strategy, 340 (1954).
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Inurn opportunity to attain these values, that "security" lies in preserving the status quo. Intuitive pessimism stems from liaison of the
postulate that change 'viii probably be detrimental to the elite unless
change factors are controlled 'vith the observation that these factors
tend to elude control.
In the economic sortie, the adversary po,ver elite is confronted with
sudden, radical and detrimental change. During this confrontation,
the reaction of the adversary may be to accept the demands of the
economic 'varfare strategist before the situation further deteriorates
-the po,ver elite assuming that if change is accepted a situation can
be stabilized. This is the sense of resignation or entrapment in the
power elite of the adversary which the strategist seeks. The desired
process is retrogressive-a slo'v falling back by the adversary power
elite to postures 'vhich it believes it can maintain.
Apart from this coincidence in objective of Inilitary and economic
'varfare strategies, there are other similarities as 'veil as dissimilarities in principles. These should be understood to permit economic
warfare, particularly the econo1nie sortie, to be used 'vith maximum
effect by military officers in command or advisory positions.

Target Analysi.'J .· The Power Elite
The number, complexity and mobility of the po,ver elite of the
adversary are matters considered in military or econo1nic warfare
strategy. The less the po,ver elite in number and complexity, and the
less mobile its membership, the simpler becomes identification of key
elite members and appraisal of their p~rceptivity and sensitivity.
When the critical elite members are defined-those 'vho have the
po,ver to 1nake the decisions desired-effective and econon1ical measures to disturb their psychical equilibria can be selected.
The present trend in governments of heavily populated states is
to,vards complex po,ver elites. Developments in the United States,
the Soviet Union and Red China are examples, although China,
historically, has exhibited complex governmental structures. This
trend is accelerated by concomitant trends to,vards "neof~udalism"
in world organization. 12
Under these conditions it is difficult for either a military or economic 'varfare strategist to determine the points 'vithin the governmental structure of an adversary at 'vhich the desired decisions
might be made. There have been fe,v instances in modern times, for
example, in 'vhich the po,ver to make all critical decisions has been
concentrated in a single person \Vithin the governmental structure of
a major state. The administrative requirements of a major state
12

See Fn. 19, infra, this Chapter.
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weigh against such concentrations of power. Hitler and Napoleon
perhaps come closest to exe1nplifying the hypothetical total concentration.
An adequate appraisal of Hitler's personal influence within his
government was not made by Allied intelligence agencies before or
during World War II. His degree of perceptivity of his environment and the psychical points at which he \Vas particularly vulnerable to attack were not accurately ascertained.
The , force of Hitler's personal leadership \Yas demonstrated at
intervals. His ability to retain his grip upon the German government
after the attempted assassination in 1944 is a salient example. A great
deal \vas learned about his personality and peculiar limitations when
the war was over. But at no time during the war were the Allies
able to disturb by military, psychological or economic means Hitler's
psychical equilibrium in fhe 1nanner that the equilibrium of the
Fascist power elite \Vas disturbed in Italy.
The defeat of Nazi Germany \vas accomplished by blindly groping
forward to lay \vaste German military resources. This created a
serious temporary European po\ver vacuum. The power of the
victors was substantially diminished.
An economic sortie directed to disturb the psychical equilibrium
of Hitler \vould have been futile because Allied intelligence could
not have supported it. To service effectively an economic sortie
directed against the po,ver elite \Vithin a con1plicated governmental
framework, a n1ore efficient intelligence system is required than any
possessed by the combatants of V\T or ld. War II.
In the Age of Napoleon the difficulties in producing adequate
intelligence \Vere not equally great. 'I'he perceptivity, sensitivity and
authority of Napoleon, the most analyzed man in history, were "'"ell
kno\vn to his contemporaries. Many of these contemporaries at various times were both his allies and enemies.
After Napoleon's military reverse at Leipzig, \Yhich resulted in a
loss of confidence in him by many of his officers and men, his
enemies capitalized upon his quick perception of the morale of his
troops and his ·un\villingness to fight with troops of lo\v morale.
Ignoring Napoleon's threat to their flanks, the Allies moved directly
upon Paris. This \vas the n1ajor French supply base and the symbol
of French unity and po,ver. 1,he loss of Paris \Vas the cro\vning blo\v
to the morale of the French army. Although he retained an army of
substantial size, Napoleon abdicated when he concluded its morale
could not be restored.
The economic sortie, as in the Louisiana Purchase, could be used
effectively against Napoleon. The. Spanish kne\v Napoleon, personally, could decide, once and for all, \vhether the Louisiana Territory
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would be ceded to the lJnited States or not. No Frenchman would
quibble with him about it. The Spanish could also appraise the
pressures to \V hich Napoleon was subject and, based upon their past
experience with him, how he \vas likely to respond to additional
pressure placed upon him.
The less complicated the governmental structure of the adversary
and the less complex its po,ver elite, the less becomes the strategic
intelligence burden in military and economic warfare. It is an
anomaly that the economic sortie has been used most frequently by
small states against great ones-when the intelligence burden is
heavy-and less frequently by large states against small ones-when
the intelligence burden is relatively light.
Assuming adequate intelligence relative to the identity, mobility,
perceptivity and sensitivity of the target power elite, the techniques
selected for dislocating the value processes of the adversary in military or econoinic warfare should be those conserving the resources of
the strategist. This princi pie is described as "economy of force" in
military operations. The princi pie is implicated equally in economic
warfare.
Economy· of force requires relationship of the means available to
the end sought. At the outset the question is one of the intensity of
value dislocation required.
Limitatio~

Upon Impact of Economic Warfare

The intensity of impact of economic ·warfare upon a target \viii
usually be much less than that developed by military methods. A few·
American \Vriters, including those dealing with Communist economic
·w arfare, appear to believe the potential effects of economic warfare
and military warfare can be roughly equated. 13
There is little in the history of economic warfare to justify this
belief. In a culture conditioned to the use of \Vealth as a major basis
for the exercise of power the tendency is to overestimate the potential
of economic \Varfare.
The degree of psychical disequilibrium \vhich a strategist must
produce depends upon the resistance of the target elite. This resistance may be so intense that the degree of disequilibrium required
may necessitate more coercion than can be developed in economic
warfare.
Military po,ver applied to an adversary may force major policy
changes. Economic \varfare alone seldom achieves this result. If an
economic sortie cannot be combined \vith existing pressures upon an
adversary, collateral pressures should be developed by supplementary
economic, psychological or military methods.
1a E.g., Allen, Soviet Economic Warfare (1960), passim.
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When complete psychical disequilibrium of an adversary is sought
by a strategist, economic warfare often \Vill be found to play a part
in creating the disequilibrium. On the _other hand, economic \varfare
usually will be only one of several policy devices involved.
When Lee was maneuvered out of his defenses at Petersburg in
1865 by Grant, he abandoned the line of the vVeldon Railroad, which
would have been the short route to a junction with the retreating
Confederate Army of Johnston in N·orth Carolina. I ...ee could look
for no supplies over this rail line, vV1lmington, North Carolina,
having fallen to the Union forces. His supply shortage forced his
\vithdra\val towards the Confederate supply center at Greensboro.
Hotly pursued by the Union Army, Lee lost Ewell's Corps, captured at Sayler's Creek. 'rhis cut heavily into his fighting strength.
He then discovered Union elements entrenched across his line of
withdrawal. His cavalry commander informed him that these elements could be driven off. But further difficulties complicated his
operational planning.
The morale and physical condition of his remaining troops were
poor. Many of his officers and men were ·willing to continue the fight.
But many others had d]scarded their weapons and, while still with
the Army, had abandoned their units.
Rations ordered to Lee at Amelia Court House had not arrived
due to an administrative oversight. Rations on hand for the Army
were low and forage for animals \vas exhausted. Neither could be
replenished from the countryside.
The Confederate Army had hoarded its ammunition. Confederate
ordnance officers reported approximately 75 rounds per man of small
arms ammunition and 93 rounds per gun for artillery. This \vas sufficient for one major engagement. 1'here were, however, no other
ordnance supplies available to the Confederates in Virginia. The
Union blockade combined with seizure of the copper mines in Tennessee had created a shortage of copper needed to manufacture percussion caps. 14 Without percussion caps, most of the small arms then
used by the Confederacy would not fire .....t.\..t Appomattox, copper sufficient to manufacture percussion caps for a combat expenditure of
two weeks was on hand in the Confederacy. This shadow overcast
any further operational plan.ning Lee might undertake.
Lee, at this time, \vas the single member of the Confederate power
elite whose decision could irretrievably unlock the defenses of the
14

Brigadier General E: P. Alexander, a Confederate officer with much experience in ordnance supply, saw no answer to this "quandary." Alexander, Military
Memoirs of a Confederate, 54 (1912).
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South. I£ the Army o£ Northern Virginia surrendered, other Confederate arn1ies in the field would fall like a stack o£ cards.
Possibly no single factor mentioned 'vould have induced Lee to
surrender at that particular time and place. But his perception o£ a
combination o£ detrimental pressures, the combination being to a
degree fortuitous, convinced hi1n that surrender 'vas the only rational alternative.
His logistical proble1ns 'vere an indirect outgro,vth o£ economic
warfare by the Union and the shortage o£ copper 'vas a direct effect
o£ the Federal naval blockade. Ho,vever, it 'vas obvious to Lee, and
to most o£ his senior officers, that military blo,vs would fall 'vhich
he could not resist with the fragments o£ his army remaining. The
surrender was produced primarily by military pressure. Economic
warfare tended to affect principally its timing.
I£ multiple pressures cannot be developed against an adversary
by the state o£ the economic 'varfare strategist, the simplest method
for combining economic sorties 'vith other coercive devices is to
array a number o£ states in economic 'var£are. This might be done
under the auspices o£ an international organization, such as the
Organization o£ American States.
The exercise o£ military command under the aegis o£ an international organization may complicate decision making. The flexibility
o£ military power may be limited in a fashion that compensation for
the limitation may be required, such as an increase in military force
applied or an extension o£ the area o£ hostilities to permit freedom
o£ maneuver.
Economic warfare under the aegis of an international organization
requires less coordination in decision making. The intensity o£ impact
tends to be increased by multilateral economic action. The principle
o£ economy o£ force thus tends to favor unilateral military action and
multilateral economic action.

Sust.entive Range and Ambit of Arrest
I£ economic action in the conflict situation is considered capable
o£ creating the degree o£ psychical disequilibrium in the po"rer elite
of the adversary sought by the strategist, either alone or concomitantly with some other policy device or devices, then t'vo additional
problems bearing upon the principle o£ economy o£ force should be
considered. The economic technique selected should have: ( 1) "sustentive range," and (2) an adequate "ambito£ arrest."
"Sustentive range~' means the degree to 'vhich the economic technique selected is amenable to supplementary action. Is it a technique
'vhich tends to preclude supple1nentary action? A pow"er elite, forced
to make a basic decision, must be locked upon its course. Psychical
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disequilibrium is a temporary condition-and supplementary decisions \viii be required to execute any coerced policy.
Even though psychical disequilibrium of the desired degree has
been created, there n1ust be follo"·-up or supporting pressures as the
effects of an econo1nic sortie di1ninish. Deviations by subordinate
officials of an adversary, for example, can alter a decision radically
as it is executed. It may be necessary for the strategist to bring pressure upon these subordinates as \veil as upon the basic decision
makers. Certain economjc devices, such as manipulations of foreign
aid, tend to lack sustentive range and, for this reason, violate the
principle of economy of force.
"Ambit of arrest" refers to the likelihood of suppression by the
strategist of the collatera1 effects of an economic "·ea pon. Elements
of "feedback" or "chain reaction'_' in economic \varfare may attrite
the resources of the state of the strategist or his allies. Can this
feedback or chain reaction be controlled if the economic 'veapon
under consideration is selected?
In the Nazi Regime, feedback from "defensive" economic warfare
undertaken by Hitler against \Yhat he considered a private economic
'varfare program intended to undermine the financial structure of his
government, resulted in a loss to the Nazi of foreign exchange and
consolidation of the po,ver of the SS \vithin the Nazi hierarchy to
the discomfiture of many N azj officials. Liaison of this defensive
economic warfare \vith persecution of German J e'vs provided an
entering \Vedge for the SS.
As early as 1936, Hitler procured a la'v imposing mandatory punishment of death and confiscation of property upon a German \vho
smuggled property abroad or left property abroad "for his o\vn
gain or for other lo'v motives'~ so that damage was inflicted upon
the German econo1ny.l 5 'Taking advantage of this problem of outflo'v
of assets through emigration, SS officials inaugurated in 1938 an
emigration program in 'vhich foreign assets of 'veal thy Jews in Germany 'vere to be confiscated to subsidize the passage of poor Jewish
emigrants. The progra1n fell under the supervision of Reinhardt
Heydrich in 1939.
Goering, and a fe,v others high in the Nazi Party hierarchy, were
alert to the economic problem the Heydrich program presented.
Foreign exchange \Vas being used up \vhich Germany badly neededwith the difference between the amounts confiscated and the amounts
paid for passage apparently lining the coffers of the SS.
Schacht, President of the Reichbank, proposed an alternative plan
negotiated with England and the International Refugee Committee.
15
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Schacht's Plan ·was to freeze the assets of the German Je·wish Community and use these as security for a loan to obtain funds for
passage. The loan was to be repayable in twenty or twenty-five years.
The SS could not be permitted to do away with the security for the
loan and the program ·would thus have to come under the supervision
of Schacht in the Reichbank.
The Schacht Plan \Vas rejected by Hitler, \Vho failed to grasp the
advantages to the SS and disadvantages to Nazi Germany as a whole
stemming from Heydrich's management. Beyond the reach of the
Reich Ministry of Justice, and thus enjoying practical immunity
from civil or criminal action-amenable, in fact, only to the heavyhanded personal justice of Hitler, \vhose attention was distracted by
military matters; senior officers of the SS ran the emigration program substantially as they sa\v fit. The program \Vas extended to the
conquered territories with commensurate financial returns to the SS.
As Hitler's policy shifted from emigration to his "Final Solution
of the J e\vish Proble1n,'~ administration of the program by the SS,
commencing in 1938 as an intended form of defensive economic warfare, burgeoned into a commercialized holocaust. 16 Genocide now
became one of the most profitable business ventures in history. Resources needed by Germany for the conduct of the \Var were expended
foolishly and mercilessly in extenninating helpless people. Through
ransom and other devices, the SS \Vas increasingly enriched. By 1944,
enjoying both economic po,ver and the confidence of Hitler, the SS
had become a state \vithin a state. How this po,ver could have been
accommodated comfortably in the organization of a successful Nazi
Germany is speculative. By any token, its po,ver \Vas a remarkable,
feedback from early Nazi experiments in economic warfare.
Economic \Varfare, like military warfare, io produce maximum
psychical disequilibrium in the adversary, requires operations against
points of minimum resistance. There are, however, differences in the
range of selection of targets in economic and military \Varfare and
also differences in time and disclosure factors \vhen military and
economic warfare techniques are employed.

FleOJibi'lity in Target Selection
In military warfare, the goal of psychical disequilibrium of the
adversary is attained through the threat of destruction or actual
destruction of human or material resources. Although the ultimate
goal of economic \varfare is identical, there is greater selectivity in
intermediate policy objectives. For example, econo1nic \Yarfare may
be directed against the legal institutions of an adversary. These
16
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would be an unremunerative target £or military action. But disruption of the legal institutions of the adversary will tend to dislocate
all value processes upon which the adversary relies.
An attack upon the legal institutions of an adversary often \viii
require combination of psychological _and economic measures. The
legal system is \veakened by propaganda reducing confidence in its
administrators. The flow of wealth to the adversary is then decreased
or increased radically to strain the weakened system. Psychological
measures are unnecessary when the legal system is poorly developed
or debilitated. A "'vealth overload," such as that produced by premature industrialization of an underdeveloped nation, may place
burdens upon its legal system which cannot be sustained.
A dramatic example of the potential political consequences of a
"wealth overload" upon a primitive or debilitated legal system is
dissolution of the Mongol Empire resulting in part from adoption
of the "tax farm" as a revenue system. This policy was recommended
to the Mongol Khans by Y elui -Ch'uts'ai, a North Chinese in the
service of J enghiz Khan. 17
Probably Y elui did not foresee the developments following upon
his recommendation. Millions of his fellow countrymen were threatened with extermination. As an alternative, Y elui recommended their
preservation as a tax resource, a policy then not follo\ved by the
Mongols but subsequently adopted by them.
During an era in which the Mongol cavalry froze the whole of
Europe in an ice of fear, the simple Yasak, or constitutional law, of
the Mongols could not reconcile conflict among the hordes produced
by competition for tax wealth. This struggle sapped the expansionist
energy of the Mongols. Its divisive influence brought the Mongol
Empire to an end.
Ti11U3-Spac-e and DiscZosu11e· Factors in Economic Warfare

In addition to the range of selection of targets in economic warfare, which greatly exceeds that of military warfare, the direction
and method of approach to the adversary also differ. This gives rise
to different emphases upon the element of time in planning and
executing economic \varfare policy and upon the importance of disclosures of plans to an adversary. These differences may be introduced by describing a simple military operation.
On the second day of the Battle of the Wilderness, in 1864, the
right flank of a division of General Sedg,vick's Federal 6th Corps,
covered in front by earthworks, \Vas exposed by the unexpected with17
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drawal of an adjacent unit. The exposed flank was discovered and
reported to General Gordon, a Confederate brigade commander.
General Gordon sought the per1nission of his corps commander,
General Ewell, to attack this weak point with his brigade. However,
Gordon's division commander, General Early, believed the Union 9th
Corps was supporting the right of the 6th, and prevailed upon
General Ewell to withhold permission.
After much time 'vas lost, and darkness \vas approaching, General
Ewell gave Gordon the requested permission at the insistence of
General Lee, who had just arrived on that part of the field. The
Union division on the flank was surprised and two of its brigades
routed. But night fell before the Confederate attack could be fully
developed. The assault lost momentum and the Union generals obtained sufficient respite to reinforce the position of the 6th Corps.
The Union weakness \Vas temporary; and the Union generals had
the resources to remedy it. Had speed been developed in planning
and launching the Confederate attack, time would have \Vorked
against the Union Army. The shift of men and materials (mass)
to the point of weakness by the Union generals was permitted by the
delay of the Confederates and the cover of darkness.
The military maneuver (using the term as embracing both planning and execution) has as its major feature the movement of men
and material in space to concentrate or mass power at critical points
-those at which decisions can be obtained. The space and mass problems in military and economic warfare are much the same.
Gordon's problem was to limit the space for maneuver by the
Union force \Vhile developing additional space for his o\vn maneuver.
Upon disclosure of Gordon's intention-\vhich occurred when the
strength of his attack was demonstrated-the Union force extended
its space for maneuver by utilizing its ability to reinforce the point
of attack. The space in the area of confrontation \vas constant.
Gordon's space for maneuver \Vas decreased as the Union space for
maneuver increased. Space is determined by the ability to utilize
mass.
The analogy is substantially complete in economic warfare. A victim of economic attack can look to its actual or potential allies for
assistance just as the Union generals could call up reinforcements
to help the 6th Corps. The more help the target of economic attack
receives, the less the maneuver space of the attacker.
Two differences are in time and disclosure factors. These factors
also differ when economic warfare is used as a primary policy device
and when it is used as a secondary policy device. A third difference
lies in the emphasis upon institutional changes in economic warfare
which are minimal in military warfare.
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In the military maneuver, the time elapsing while a plan is formulated and its execution begins increases or decreases the chance that
the adversary 'vill discover prematurely by inadvertence of the
planners or by espionage the nature, time and point of attack. If
the nature, time and point of attack are not disclosed until the attack
is executed, the psychical disequilibrium o:f the adversary will be
intensified.
As the level upon which strategy is formulated becomes higher,
the emphasis upon concealing the nature and point of a proposed
attack and the ability to conceal these elements progressively decreases: Emphasis upon concealing the tirne of the attack correspondingly increases. In a future possible war bet,veen the United States
and the Soviet Union or Communist China, no appreciable uncertainty exists concerning the nature and probable points of attack
by any contestant. The elements which 'vill be held most secret are
the times for attack when these are determined and the resources
which would be committed.
When economic warfare is used as a secondary policy device, the
requirements of the primary policy device 'vill control. In this secondary role, economic vvarfare often 'vill be " "aged to support military action. When strategy at a high level is supported, the method
and direction of economic vvarfare 'vill be limited only by the
requirement that the time and resources for attack be concealed from
the adversary. If military strategies at lo,ver levels are supported, it
may be necessary to conceal the nature and point of the military
attack as well.
In either instance, the time elapsing between the time strategic
planning commences and the time the plan is executed 'vill condition
the method and direction of economic vvarfare. Neither the direction
nor method of economic warfare, considering the time of exposure
of the military plan to potential disclosures, should compromise elements concealed to enhance probable success of the military action.
Economic warfare in this situation is used to attrite the defense or
blunt the attac~ of an adversary. Reliance is placed upon military
action to produce psychical disequilibrium of the adversary po,ver
elite.
When economic vvarfare is employed as a primary policy device,
the element of delayed disclosure to produce surprise, so critical in
military operations, is not equally significant. \Vhen a strategist relies
upon economic warfare as a primary policy device, psychical disequilibrium of the adversary is produced by realization of an anticipated detriment. It is not the shock of the unexpected, as in 1nilitary
operations, producing disequilibrium by disorientation and distraction, but rapid progress of the expected which enhances intuitive
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pessimism of the adversary po,ver elite. There may or may not be
danger in disclosure of the economic 'varfare plan. The premium
upon time in planning economic 'varfare as a prirnary policy device
thus often will be much less than in planning military strategy.
Premature disclosure would have spoiled the effect of the Spanish
withdrawal of the right of deposit at New Orleans. Napoleon's
pessimism concerning his Caribbean venture 'vas stimulated largely
by his military difficulties in Santo Domingo. The Spanish recognized this ill fortune and took advantage of it. Premature disclosure
of the Spanish plan would have crystallized a counterpolicy for
Napoleon-not induced his sale of Louisiana by compounding his
pessimism. Napoleon was highly perceptive and could be counted
upon by Spain to take changes in his environment rapidly into
account.
But the perceptivity of the adversary pow·er elite in the conflict
situation may be such that disclosure or "leaks" of a plan may be
necessary to create a psychological milieu in 'v hich an economic
sortie will have maximum effect. Time Inay be required to insure
perception by the target-or to bring home to the target the nature
of the attack proposed.
A delay of this sort usually cannot be tolerated in military operations. In the Mau Mau War in Kenya, for example, military action
was against small and mobile groups. In fe,v of these 'vas a power
elite clearly defined and the perception of the leaders who could make
decisions for the l{ikiyu 'vas so limited that they could not readily
grasp the extent of the po,ver arrayed against them. There could
be no delay, ho·wever, for indoctrination. Militant tribal elements
were hunted do,vn and exterminated. The survivors 'vere placed in
compounds for a deliberate effort to reeducate them.
In economic 'varfare, especially when 'vaged by economic sortie,
when the adversary po,ver elite proves unperceptive the strategist
must disclose his plan or elements of it so the target power elite can
observe and appreciate its vulnerability. This 'vould never be done in
military operations other than as a feint or distraction. But the
disequilibrium creating processes in military and economic warfare
differ. The former disorients by surprise and shock; the latter by
the shock of an anticipated detriment suddenly experienced.

P roblem of Institutional Change in Economic W a.rfare
The r apid institutional changes often required in economic warfare, contrasted 'vith the relative stability of institutions in military
warfare, a third difference heretofore mentioned, place a premium
upon the capacities of contestants in an econon1ic 'varfare situation
to alter administrative routines, legal procedures and doctrines, and
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sometimes basjc political tenets. In military operations, units may be
reorganized, reequipped or retrained, but the basic patterns for these
changes and the basic patterns for employment of the units change
quite gradually. Military la,ws, standing operating procedures and
administrative routines, are virtually static. The higher the level of
military management, the more static these elements tend to be in
order to avoid the disturbance at lower command levels which shifts
in basic guidelines tend to produce.
Major variables in military operations tend to be in physical conditions, such as weather, terrain; range and flexibility of 'vea pons;
number, health and experience of personnel. The smaller the unit for
which action is planned, the greater the likelihood that unorthodox
strategies and tactics will surprise the adversary by confronting him
with unexpected situations.
But the larger the force directed, and the more complicated and
destructive the weapons 'vith which the force is armed, the greater
the need for simple and fixed routines for its employment. With the
large force, as has been pointed out previously in this discussion, the
emphasis is greater upon the time element than upon unorthodox
technique or even upon secrecy concerning the method and point of
attack. In any large force, 've must deal at the level of execution of
policy with small units, and it is here that the premium is upon
unorthodox and unexpected action in conflict.
To this extent there i~ a resemblance in degree to the institutional
change required in economic 'varfare. The difference is that in economic warfare this institutional change is of value at high policy
levels; although at these levels, institutions, and in particular legal
institutions, tend to resist change. The more basic or fundamental a
legal or political doctrine is found to be, the more difficult and time
consuming the processes of changing it.
The difficulty and tendency to,vards delay in change does not arise
from failures of communication in explaining change to the political
mass of the state of the economic 'varfare strategist. In primitive
legal systems, change has been explained successfully through the
appealing mys~icis1n of revelation. Mature. legal systems have sophisticated and effective mechanisms for change, such as the dialectical
materialism of the ~farxists or the doctrine of judicial supremacy,
perhaps a less flexible device, developed by judicial decisions in the
United States. These change devices are important safety elements in
complicated societies.
The resistance to changes in basic la 'vs or political doctrines stems
from the power elite of the community. This elite cannot predict with
certainty the effect change 'vill have upon the la'v and nonla'v conduct patterns of the political mass. Experjments with "positive" law,
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doctrines and operating institutions specialized to immediate although often temporary reductions in the intensity of conflict, are
conducted constantly without excessive community disturbance. Experiments 'vith fundamental law and political doctrine, policy statements of guidelines or basie value preferences of a community, are
hazardous and unpredictable and for these reasons are undertaken
infrequently.
Power elites in monolithic societies, such as the Soviet Union, have
demonstrated their ability to change positive la'v rapidly to support
foreign policies in economic or other areas. Difficulty has been encountered with basic law and political theory.
Stalin's "Dual Market" concept, for example, the lodestone of
Soviet economic warfare, ".,.as a sharp break fro1n conventional
Marxist-Leninist economie theory. Never completely accepted by the
Soviet Communist Party during Sta.lin's lifetime, the concept 'vas
quickly repudiated after his death.
The resistance to change or "legal inertia" encountered in attempted manipulations of legal and political institutions affects economic 'varfare principally in the planning stage because planning
tends to be done in coercion of this nature principally upon a high
policy level. The speed with 'vhich plans can be developed is inhibited
and premature disclosures of plans are sometimes forced. As previously indicated, in some forms of econo1nic 'varfare and in certain
policy contexts, these delays and disclosures may be advantageous.
When economic 'varfare is used as a primary policy device, disclosures may be desirable to insure perceptivity in the adversary
power elite. In economic 'varfare by protracted harassment, time
typically is of little significance in either planning or execution.
But when economic 'varfare is ·waged by economic sortie, time and
secrecy may be critical. Delays and disclosures stemming from legal
inertia in planning may be compensated by speed and flexibility in
using positive la 'v and administrative routines as the economic sortie
is executed. Planning at this policy level also is required. But pressures at the operational level exclude the full impact of formal legal
inhibitions and place a premiu1n upon invention and initiative.
At this operational level in economic "'arfare, usually requiring
rapid planning under pressure, naval and other military officers are
likely to play an important part. The major problem of these officers
at this policy level, apart from the djfficulty in finding and correlating facts, 'vill probably be a problem in "legal strategy." Ho'v do
legal institutions bear upon policies under consideration and ho"T can
these institutions be used effectively in executing a policy 'vhich is
selected? It is in the context of "legal strategy," also, that the ad-
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vantages of the "economic sortie" become apparent when compared
with economic warfare by protracted harassment.
5. Policy Advantages of Economic Sortie Techniques in Economic
Warfare

The context in 'v hich econon1ic "Tarfare is waged is in constant
change. Unless the fact and nature of context changes are appreciated
by all policy makers at all levels of decision in economic 'varfare,
blind adherence to accuston1ed techniques, such as embargoes and
boycotts, may damage the state "raging economic 'varfare and nonparticipants in the conflict as 'veil. This diffusion of damage, among
other consequences, may give rise to authoritative characterizations
by institutions of the general community that the damaging economic
action is impermissive. Various detriments to the state 'vaging economic warfare may stem from these characterizations.

E conornic Sortie a8 a Primary Policy D.evice
In a wealth environment in which the resources of all con1petitors
are sharply limited, as in private commerce or as in the international
arena of economic conflict in the 18th and 19th centuries, private
commercial techniques could. be used effectively by a state to stifle
competition and support monopolies in values. This 'vealth environment was rapidly changing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
A strategist contemplating economic "·arfare today discovers his
adversary is no longer economically isolated as he might have found
the adversary "naturally" isolated in the 19th century. In part, this
is due to technological developments, including for future consideration developments in nuclear pow·er. 'The more important reason for
the disappearance of economic isolation, ho,vever, is the trend
towards politicization of 'vealth distribution processes among states.
The element of "economy" or "'vealth conservation" in converting
the resources of states into 'vealth is subordinated to estimates of the
political advantage to be derived.
Red China, for example, procures sugar fro1n Cuba for political
reasons rather than from more accessible and less costly sources. Payments for the sugar are in goods or ra "r Inaterials manufactured or
produced without regard to a profit mo6ve. The massive aid programs of Western and Sino-Soviet states seem now· permanent features in the structure of external relations of the states concerned.
The politicization of 'vealth distribution processes is due in part
to reactions by affected states to economic 'varfare by protracted
harassment in the past. 'The more protracted and intense harassment
becomes, the more rapid becomes generation of defensive energy. In
part, the politicization of weath distribution processes also described
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the preference of currently powerful states for economic warfare by
protracted harassment.
These influences of the past and trends of the present have produced three conditions complicating the ·waging of economic warfare
in any form which a strategist might select. (1) A neofeudal psychology attenuates the impact of economic action. (2) Predispositions
by policy makers concerning economic ·warfare make joint economic
action difficult to organize and, as previously indicated, joint economic action tends to be the most effective. ( 3) A maze of legal
doctrines and administrative regulations make rapid economic action
difficult to execute.

Neofeudalism: Economic Reinforcement
Economic and political ties are becoming tightly dra \Vn among
states: expectations of aid by states lacking or poor in resources,
whether or not formalized in agreements, are becoming both stereotyped and realized in fact. An emerging neofeudal psychology in
both the Western and Sino-Soviet spheres of influence is replacing
colonial ties.l 8 For example, wheat, steel, aluminum, and the mental
and physical resources involved in producing these things, are increasingly symbolized as "Free World Assets," vis-a-vis those of the
Soviet or Sino-Soviet Blocs.
During the Suez Crisis of 1956, a Soviet trading corporation
breached its contract for sale of crude oil to Israel. Thirty years
before, nondelivery of the promised oil \Vould have been a major
impediment to execution of the \Var plans of a. state dependent upon
foreign sources for fuel. The Soviet oil embargo proved a temporary
annoyance in 1956. The necessary oil was obtained by Israel from her
'Vestern allies.
In its economic war \vith Cuba, the United States can aggrandize
the internal problems of the Castro regime by an embargo and
boycott. But Castro can look to Sino-Soviet states for aid. This has
included not only military supplies but sufficient food to maintain
the Cuban people at a subsistence level.
4f)
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The enduring element of European medieval feudalism has been the psychology of status infused into the English Common and European Civil Law. The
essence of neofeudalism is the expectation, now generally shared, that certain
communities are entitled to economic assistance because of state status. The
concept of reciprocal responsibility by a state so aided to support, politically
or otherwise, the state or international organization furnishing economic assistance has not crystallized. Competition in foreign aid, a mild form of economic warfare by protracted harassment, reduces the prospect that this obligation of reciprocal support is likely to develop by encouraging the recipient of
aid to take advantage of its bargaining position.
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It is no answer to the dilemma of the economic warfare st rategist
to suggest waging economic warfare against those states \vith no
political friends. Not only are true political pariahs rare but those
that can be found are unlikely to pose a threat justifying retaliation
by economic measures.
Alternatively, a strategist may seek assistance from other states to
prevent escape by the adversary or may act with such speed that
escape is impossible. But past economic ·warfare by protracted harassment has created an environment in which joint economic action is
difficult to organize and economic action in any form is difficult to
execute speedily.

Difficulty in lJf obilizing Joint Action
It has been pointed out in this Chapter that the most effective
economic ·warfare is that ".,.aged· jointly by t\vo or more states. The
best chance to obtain this cooperation is under the aegis of an existing international organization.
Article 41 of the United Nations Charter provides in part for an
application by members of measures including " * * * complete or
partial interruption of econon1ic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio and other means of communication * * * " when
called upon to apply these measures by the Security Council. However, political divisions within the United Nations, complicated by a
rapid increase in membership, rnake effective cooperation in economic
warfare within the frame·w·ork of the Organization unlikely. This
suggests that joint economic ·warfare can be organized most frequently within the frame\vork of an existing regional organization.
But action within these organizations as well as action under special
agreements formulated for the purpose also suffer impediments.
Economic warfare by \Vestern states and those of Sino-Soviet
orientation is complicated by the predisposition of allies or rivals to
seek advantages as third parties in an economic conflict situation. ~
In the Western bloc the predisposition is to reap commercial advantage for private profit from the conflict. British and Canadian transactions with Cuba, offsetting to a degree the impact of the United
States embargo, are exa1nples.
The Sino-Soviet split has resulted in similar conflict within the
Communist \Vorld, although political and not economic profit motives
are dominant. Red Chinese aid to Albania, offsetting Soviet economic
action against that country and \Veakening action against Albania
by European Soviet satellites, and Chinese interference with Soviet
aid to North Viet N am illustrate the joint economic warfare problem
of the Communists.
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Apart £rom these obstacles to organizing joint action in economic
warfare, policy makers are predisposed to resist participation in
economic warfare by protracted harassment.
There is a 'videly shared belief that economic 'varfare alone seldom
can force a decision by an adversary. It is assluned that supporting
techniques must be employed, sometimes involving a greater degree
of physical violence than the situation is deemed to justify. vVhile
the actual effects 'vhich economic 'varfare can be expected to achieve
depend upon the degree of psychical disequilibri u1n required in the
power elite of the adversary, the negligible results characteristic of
economic warfare by protracted harassment lend some support to the
assumption that economic 'varfare alone can achieve no in1portant
effects.
These policy makers also fear ":feedback" injury in economic war
:fare. A characteristic of econo1nic 'var:fare by protracted harassment
is the additional protraction and ·wide diffusion of its effects. The
danger o:f stimulating panic is particularly acute.
France, :for example, ·withdrew short term credits to German and
Austrian banks to undermine the Austro-German Custo1ns Union of
1931. These 'vithdra,va]s contributed to the failure of a 1najor
Austrian bank. Seeking to forstall this French effort, England made
an emergency loan to Austria. Retaliating, France 'vithdre\v gold
:from the Bank of England; "Thereupon England abandoned the gold
standard to weaken the gold position of France. Disturbances produced by these actions reinforced the impact o:f initial :failure of the
Austrian bank and caused nu1nerous German bank failures. The
latter 'vere felt globally.
A 'vareness of propaganda losses often incident tD ~nomic :warfare
contributes to the un\villingness of state officials to participate in
joint economic action. The potential propaganda losses are balanced
against potential gains to be achieved.
The propaganda loss is based in part upon a general readiness
by people everywhere to identify economic 'Yarfare 'Yith the planning
o:f aggressive 'var charged against defeated political and military
leaders o:f the Axis po,vers after \Vorld \Var II. This syn1bolic "guilt
by association" has proven useful, especially to Communist propagandists. But more significant is the hypersensitivity of officials of
new or underdeveloped countries to economic pressures-including
those of an innocent and entirely innocuous nature.
To relieve a :famine in India, :for example, the United States Congress directed the Administrator :for Economic Cooperation to provide emergency food relief on credit. 19 Unfortunately, the Administrator 'vas instructed to seek concessions.
19

India Emergency Food Aid Act, 65 Stat. 69 (1951).
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These concessions 'vere not a condition to the credit or stated
explicitly in the statute. Ho"·ever, one 1najor concession to be sought
,vas removal of the Indian embargo on monazite sands, a thorium
source. Another 'vas increased sales of hemp to the United States.
Propaganda hostile to the United States could be based upon t he
innocent coupling of relief Y\:ith proposed agree1nents to buttress the
military strength of the United States. rrhe Communists 'vere alert
to their advantage. The Indian embargo and trade policies ren1ained
unchanged; and the United States lost much of the good,vill in India
'vhich its relief efforts might other,vise have engendered.
The difficulty in obtaining cooperative state effort in econo1nic ·warfare might be compensated to an extent by speed, accurate direction,
and force in economic action. But fused 'vith the hostile psychological environment in 'vhich economic 'varfare is 'vaged, is a legal
environment li1niting the flexibility and speed possible in formulating
and executing economic 'varfare plans.
As pointed out previously in this Chapter, and reiterated here
for emphasis, institutional changes tend to be required in economic
warfare. These include changes in legal institutions. :\fore changes
tend to be required 'vhen economic 'varfare is planned than when economic 'varfare is executed; and institutional changes in economic
'varfare are more extensive than those required in military 'varfare.
"Legal institution" refers to a type of decisional process 'vithin a
community. The description is based upon the presence of the element
of "formal authority" 'vithin a community 'vhich has attained a level
of complexity and achieved a degree of cohesion permitting formal
location of a decision-making function 'vithin its po,ver structure. A
community might, for example, have ethical decisional processes, or
ethical institutions, 'vithout the element of "formalization of power"
associated with legal institutions.
A group of po,ver holders within the community make effective
decisions 'vhich are translated into action at a formal policy level
through legal institutions. This group has been described, in discussing economic 'varfare intelligence problems hitherto in this
Chapter, as a "po,ver elite."
The reader should not understand "po,ver elite" as synonomous in
most instances 'vith a narro'Y clique 'vhich closely holds the power
possessed by a community. In the state-community, the po,ver elite
typically is quite co1nplex. Furthermore, the po,ver elite is relative
to the decisions required in a specified confrontation: 'vho makes the
effective decisions?
The reader should a]so consider that all po,ver elites, vie,ved
through time and not in relation to a static set of events, are mobile
in membership. Human mortality, in addition to other mobility
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factors, produces a "biological" revolution in any power elite approximately each quarter century.
A power elite uses the legal institutions of its community to approximate a dynamic value equilibrium ·within the community membership. The group attained cohesion in the search for common
values. Unless the members have access to the values the group was
organized to seek, cohesion will be weakened or lost. Cohesion increases or diminishes with the efficiency ·with which a value equilibrium can be approximated. The larger the group, the greater the
difficulty in perfor1ning this function.
Expressing the same idea in different terms, the po,ver elite -intervenes in subgroup conflict to regulate the tempo 'vith which values
shift within the community. The intervening policy makers consistently fail to keep abreast of the conflict events: a problem described as "culture lag." The dynamic value equilibriu1n can only be
approximated. As Dean Pound once 'vrote, all thinking about la 'v
" * * * has struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need
of stability and of the need of change. * * * " 20

National Legal 0 ontewt
Viewing economic 'varfare from the perspective of the po,ver elite
of the state of the economic 'varfare strategist, the dynamic value
equilibrium of the state is threatened or disturbed by economic ·warfare in two 'vays. There may be economic attacks by other states.
A lso feedbacks from offensive economic 'varfare policies may create
disturbances.
The economic 'varfare strategist thus is likely to find his economic
'varfare planning embarrassed by his o'vn national legal doctrine:
or the past expressions of policy by the power elite of his state community, recorded or recalled, developed in past defenses to economic
attack or in past efforts to offset feedbacks from offensive economic
action. The economic warfare strategist tends to become entangled
during offensirve planning in patterns set by past defensive thinking.
The national legal doctrine of interest to an economic warfare
strategist in the United States usually will be found expressed in
Federal statutes and administrative regulations. The impact of state
policy within the United States upon economic warfare planning
has grown progressively less; and recent decisions by the United
States Supreme Court suggest negligible influence of state policy in
future economic warfare planning. 21
Pound, Interpretations of Legal History, 1 (1923).
Landmark cases limiting potential state influence in economic warfare planning and execution are Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) ; United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) ;
a nd Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
2o
21
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These national policy statements must not be vie\ved by the economic warfare strategist simply as an imn1utable and static doctrinal
pattern through which a line of effective economic action is to be
threaded. Decision makers do observe past policy statements (legal
and otherwise) in dealing with current conflict. The statement may
be influential in determining the end or goal sought. It is even more
likely that the statement will be influential in the methods chosen to
attain the end.
Nevertheless, the problem of the economic warfare strategist is not
simply one of avoiding "legal obstacles," either by fast legal footwork or by skill in obtaining changes in legal institutions, but to use
effectively existing or changed legal institutions to attain his economic warfare ends. The use of the institution is the major element
of legal strategy in economic war_fare. The use of legal institutions
imposes two major requirements upon the economic warfare strategist.
He must grasp the idea, first, that to ·o btain institutional changes
required in economic warfare he must identify and interrelate both
the variables in the confrontation requiring planning and the variables supporting the legal institution ·which he seeks to change. The
problem is illustrated in detail in Chapter II, dealing with United
States defensive economic \Varfare against Castro Cuba.
The strategist must appreciate, for example, the need for locating
and identifying the policy makers in the confrontation; the ends or
values which these policy makers seek; how the institutions the
policy makers are likely to employ will affect persons whose responses
in the confrontation are significant; and the probable nature of the
responses of these affected persons.
Once the relevant variables are firmly within his grasp, the strategist must then~ as a second head of his problem, and the direct road
to solution of it, realize that although he may plan economic coercion,
his success in the legal strategy of coercive economic action will turn
upon his powers of persuasion. Ho\v a power elite will respond in a
confrontation may be predicted in part from legal doctrine apparently relevant to the facts.
But the doub~e pinions upon ·which the persuasive mechanism is
based are adequate appraisals of ( 1) the understanding of the elite
concerning the meaning of "law'' and ( 2) the understanding of the
elite concerning the n1eaning of "lawmaking." Who is thought to be
authorized in the relevant legal order to make legal policy~ What is
the appropriate time for making or re1naking a legal policy? How
should the legal policy be made or remade \Vhen the appropriate time
arrives~ The postulates of the po\ver elite concerning these issues
must be understood if it is to be persuaded to modify or permit the
modification of legal institutions.
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The postulates of power elites concerning these issues and the
problems of persuasion conseque-ntly created for the economic warfare strategist are discussed in greater detail subsequently. For
present purposes, the reader should observe that practically all of
the existing national legal doctrine relevant to economic warfare
has been keyed to economic warfare by protracted harassment. This
applies both to fundamental doctrinal statements and to statements
concerned principally with operational method.
When the economic warfare strategist favors the economic sortie,
he presents fact situations to which past expressions of legal policy
are inapposite. Adoption of the sortie technique is not a panacea
which will eliminate the economic warfare strategist's national legal
difficulties. B:1t the technique 'viii tend to free the strategist from
the embarrassment of predispositions of his nationa~ power elite
based upon existing legal doctrine.
This is not to suggest that one is free to do things not specifically
prohibited by legal doctrine. However, the sortie technique does permit the strategist to deal directly with postulates of the power elite
concerning law and lawmaking and to present or consider for decisian with greater ease the variables in the confrontation. The likelihood of a rapid and adequate decision consequently is enhanced.
Legal problems produced by the national law of the economic warfare strategist are not, of course, the only legal problems encountered.
The emphasis in this book is upon the internat~~onallegal problems in
economic warfare.

International Legal O<Jntewt
However, in the perspective of "legal strategy" in the world community, the economic sortie as a primary policy device also is believed
to have advantages in speed and direction, and consequently potential
effectiveness, outweighing advantages likely to be achieved through
protracted harassment. These advantages in speed and direction
arise, nevertheless, for a different reason than in the national law
context of the economic warfare strategist.
In the processes of authoritative decision through which the public
order of the world community seeks to establish a dynamic value
equilibrium, the modest goals having current general consensus are
preserving minim;um order and obtaining minimum destruction of
values. Goals more conducive to stability than these seem presently
beyond the capabilities of the rudimentary legal and political institutions of the world community.
International administrative institutions, such as the World Bank
and Monetary Fund, have been created as "neutral" authorities to
interrupt certain kinds of coercive econo1nic exchanges in their incep-
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tion. This is because the protracted and diffused tensions generated
by economic harassment have not been dissipated readily by negotiation or arbitration. Disputes involving economic warfare have been
aired before organs o£ the United Nations or before regional agencies, such as the Organization o£ American States, and opinions have
been expressed even when decisions have not been rendered.
Resort to these international institutions probably will increase,
especially among states which, since World War II, have renounced
the use o£ certain kinds o£ coercive ·wealth practices in the charters
o£ international organizations or in bilateral or multilateral trade or
security treaties. New or underdeveloped nations, often targets o£
economic attack, are becoming both influential and vocal in international affairs and may be expected to invoke the procedures o£ international organizations as a de£ens~.
Authoritative doctrinal statements concerning economic warfare
as an outcome o£ the decisional processes thus briefly described are
not numerous. It is evident, on the other hand, that international
legal activity in this area is increasing.
The major ad vantage o£ the economic sortie in this context is not,
as in the context o£ national law, the presentation o£ £acts to which
existing legal doctrine is inapposite, but the reduction o£ invocations
o£ world community authority. With less diffusion o£ injury in the
economic .sortie, there is less chance £or a complaint.
Interventions by the world community will usually occur after
execution o£ the economic warfare policy has com1nenced. The important bearing o£ national law, by contrast, tends to be upon the
planning stage o£ economic warfare.
The potential impact o£ international legal institutions upon the
execution o£ economic ·warfare policies must be taken into consideration in economic warfare planning also. But i£ an intervention by the
world community occurs during execution o£ the policy, a point
clearly o£ "no return" £or the policy n1aker, various "feedbacks" o£
an economic or political nature can be anticipated in the state which
has taken the economic action.
In addition to reducing world comn1unity interventions by reducing the incentive o£ complainants to invoke world community legal
procedures, the economic sortie may cushion the impact o£ any
interventions which do occur. The policy may be executed before the
intervention takes place. The sortie will then have to he supported by
further action (assuming the technique has sustenti ve range) : and
the intervention may occur to attenuate the supporting action. However, the strategist is £ore,varned and can modify his successive policy
to accommodate the legal events or, as suggested in the discussion
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of national legal problems, can seek the legal institutional changes
necessary to effectuate his policy.

Sum11Utry of Advantages of Economic Sortie
M Primary Policy Device
Only the most sanguine student of economic warfare would conelude that preferences for economic sorties will be likely to alter to
any discernible degree the hostile psychological environment in which
economic warfare is waged. Joint state action will be as difficult to
mobilize for economic sorties as for protracted harassment.
In addition, until economic warfare as a primary policy instrument
receives the detailed and consistent professional attention devoted to
military strategy and tactics, the virtues of economic sorties may not
be recognized by the policy makers of economically powerful states
of the Free World. These policy makers are predisposed by their
domestic commercial environ1nent to techniques of protracted
harassment.
However, the economic sortie does permit, largely through the
flexibility of strategy in the legal sphere, the development of speed
and direction, compensating for the lack of joint action in part, and
precluding economic reinforcement of the target of attack. The effect
of offensive economic action is thus enhanced.
Time is not invariably critical in economic warfare. Indeed, an
economic warfare strategist, to insure that his policy has the desired
effect, may have to delay execution of his economic ·warfare plan to
bring home to the unperceptive power elite of an adversary the
nature of the economic coercion contemplated.
But a power elite so unperceptive is unlikely to pose a serious
threat to the state of the economic warfare strategist; and a state,
such as the United States~ committed to maintaining Free World
values, will engage in economic 'varfare only when these values are
jeopardized. A realistic economic warfare target for the United
States will be the perceptive power elite of a dangerous adversary.
It is against such an elite that speed and direction in economic warfare are important. These can be maximized in the economic sortie.
In rare cases in ·which 1nultistate economic ·warfare as a primary
policy device can be organized, the advantages of speed and direction
in the economic sortie are not as significant as when the state of the
economic warfare strategist acts unilaterally. Nevertheless the force
and effect of multistate economic ·warfare will be enhanced when
the economic sortie is the preferred form of economic action.
Are the advantages of economic warfare by economic sortie equally
pronounced when economic warfare is ·waged to support applications
of military force~ When economic ·warfare is used in this secondary
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policy role the nature of the military operations will determine the
form of economic warfare employed.

Economic Sortie as a Secondary Policy Device
Postulated future military operations range from a global cataclysm with ultradecisive weapons to limited unconventio11al military
efforts of a guerrilla type. General conflicts of the World War I or II
type are possibilities; and limited conflicts between major po\vers or
powers of the second or third category may involve the strategies,
tactics and weapons familiar in the Korean War. Military activity
may be concentrated upon land or sea, or in air or space-and
probably will occur in all of these media.
With this great variation possible in the nature and form of future
military conflict, and military institutions and needs determining the
form and direction of economic warfare as a secondary policy device,
discussions of economic warfare in future military contexts are
necessarily speculative.
If weapons of the types familiar in vVorld Wars I and II dominate
the battlefields and seas in World War III, military strategies and
tactics are likely to be similar, and the supporting economic \Varfare
probably will be the traditional protracted harassment interspersed
with economic sorties. It is probable, on the other hand, that the
ultradecisive weapons, nuclear, bacteriological and chemical, stocked
in the arsenals of an increasing number of states, and the changed
strategies and tactics based upon these \veapons, wi1l render \Vorld
Wars I and II and Korea the last 20th century demonstrations of
19th century military skills.
The increasing use by the Communist world of subversion through
globally directed unconventional military and guerrilla action, and
the equally unconventional military assistance programs of the Free
World developed to preclude this subversion, are dramatic demonstrations of the po\ver of unused ultradecisive weapons. The form
of future wars may be determined by unused weapons available to
the contestants and not by the weapons actually employed.
A former member o£ a board of economic warfare in "\Vorld \Var
II, if recalled to his task in World War III, 1nay find his mission
different, his techniques unfamiliar and his tenure short. Indeed,
there may be no need for his services. The maximum destruction \vith
minimum effort which can be achieved \vith nuclear \Yeapons may
eliminate all economic warfare in a secondary policy role familiar
in the past.
But if the adversaries do not join in a global nuclear Armageddon,
a period of confrontation may ensue in which the participants seek a
settlement by military means rather than by negotiation. No uncon-
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ditional capitulations might be sought in order to avoid a "last
ditch" use of ultradecisive weapons by a desperate antagonist at the
edge of defeat. Under these circumstances, military operations might
be of a "holding" or stabilizing nature with much emphasis upon
economic warfare or similar devices to produce the decisions desired.
Economic warfare may dominate in a primary policy role. Military
operations may assume secondary importance; as would supporting
economic measures in this event.
The economic measures developed to support military "holding" or
"stabilizing" operations probably ·would be selected with a view to
their immediate impact. Time, or the risk of exposure to the use of
ultradecisive weapons, will be critical. Blockade, for example, would
be selective rather than general in nature, designed to delay the
development, production, installation and delivery to target of the
unused ultradecisive we a pons producing the stalemate. The Cuban
Quarantine of 1962 suggests the form and intensity such interdictions of critical weapons and materials might take. Because of the
critical time element, the economic ·warfare posture, even in a secondary policy role, probably would be offensive rather than defensive.
In this context economic sorties might reasonably be preferred to the
delays, uncertainties and potential for miscarriage of economic
war:fare by protracted harassment.
If ultradecisive weapons, particularly nuclear types, are used on a
limited basis, such as for military tactical purposes, but strategic use
of these weapons is considered probable by the particjpants, either on
a limited or general scale, the nature of economic ·warfare may differ
from that in the confrontation in which total defeat of the adversary
is not an aim. Economic \varfare as a secondary policy device would
be likely to exceed in importance its concomitant use in a primary
policy role. Protracted harassment would be the prevailing technique
with enhanced interest in economic sorties for speed, control and
direction.
The demands of neutrals for trade and other privileges, to.. which
much attention was directed by economic warfare strategists during
World War II, may be rr1odified profoundly in a nuclear military
context. The trend is likely to be to\vards "open" or "effectively
neutral" states.
Not only will this simplify the international legal problems of the
economic \Varfare strategist, but there may be much "self regulation"
by the neutrals. An open state is likely to maintain total boycotts
and embargoes upon trade with belligerents and assiduously police
the commercial transactions of its nations to avoid identification with
any combatant.
Instead of action to interrupt neutral trade, the belligerents might
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encourage it. Discriminations might arise which could not be prevented effectively by a nonparticipant, the former sanction of
threatened participation being made too costly by the threat of
nuclear annihilation.
Assuming no effort is made by one nuclear antagonist to manipulate the population of the other, neutrals sharing land boundaries
with belligerents, or those readily accessible by sea or air and which
also possess food surpluses, may nevertheless become sanctuaries for
elements of the belligerent noncombatant populations. As hostages,
these noncombatants 'viii tend to insure the neutral against attack by
their state of origin. Sinee. all belligerents might reap advantages
from similar havens, a form of "reciprocity by hostage" might render
the sanctuaries effectively inviolate.
Trade in food, medicines and similar civilian items potentially of
military use might be encouraged among these neutral havens despite
the risks of military benefit to an antagonist. Rationing or metering
the trade between neutrals might cease to be of major concern to the
belligerents.
On the other hand, those neutrals 'vhich either are not sanctuaries
for noncombatants, or 'vhich do not have a geographic position or
economy potentially qualifying them to perform this function, might
be subjected to the types of restraints upon neutrals imposed by the
belligerents during World War II. There 'vould be no effective way
in which the neutral could prevent this discrimination.
Efforts might be made to manipulate the population of an adversary. The enemy population 1night be induced to concentrate to
present a remunerative nuclear target. Dispersion might be forced to
place a burden upon the communications and supply of the adversary. An effort might be made to panic the adversary population to
divert the opposing military strength for police or other purposes.
An example of the latter maneuver is a strategic nuclear feint. If a
belligerent is prepared to risk a preclusive nuclear strike, it might
warn the population of its antagonist of nuclear attack on a date and
place designated, pro1nising immunity to adjacent neutral areas.
This maneuver would capitalize upon several related factors: (1)
Lack of defenses to nuclear attack by the adversary; (2) Mobility of
the population-possession for example of private means of transportation ; ( 3) Lack of communication between the adversary power
elite and political mass; ( 4) Lack of police control; and ( 5) Susceptibility of the population to panic.
A similar technique has been used anticipatory to bombardment
with conventional weapons. Unnecessary loss of life was a voided and
the industrial production, transportation and communications of the
enemy were disrupted.
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Economic action supporting a strategic nuclear feint would encourage the flow of supplies into adjacent neutral areas, minimize
the opportunity for transshipment and stockpiling of these supplies
in the territory of the adversary, and decrease the flo,v of supplies
directly to the hostile territory fron1 nonadjacent neutral areas. A
supply situation would be sought 'vhich made the adjacent neutral
attractive for refuge and precluded the effective care of refugees
within the hostile territory. Protracted harassment, probably in the
form of a blockade of food and medical supplies 'vould be imposed
on hostile. ports. Preventing transshipment of these materials imported into adjacent neutral territory 'vould be most effectively accomplished by economic sorties: decisions not to transship being
required by the neutral po,ver elite.
Population concentrations in the territory of the enemy might be
accomplished by limiting the transport of food and medicines to
adjacent neutrals and metering the importation of these items into
hostile territory to create a marginal level of supply requiring close
central control and a tendency by the enemy population to gravitate
to these contr.ol centers. Blockades, a form of protracted harassment
imposed upon hostile shorelines, would figure prominently in support
of this strategy.
When the military context is dominated by unconventional and
subversive violence, such as guerrilla warfare which has been an
important feature in mjlitary relations bet\veen the Free and Communist Worlds, economic warfare by protracted harassment, defensively or offensively, becomes of decreased value. A premium lies in
careful definition of the critical power elites which are targets for
economic action and careful assessment of the economic devices likely
to influence decisions by thern. Protracted harassments, such as
denials or withdra·wals of foreign aid, often prejudice stability
within a state subject to subversive action and contribute to the
effectiveness of hostile subversive violence. The economic sortie thus
is likely to play an important role ejther as a primary or secondary
policy device in these confrontations.
It is possible that jn many n1ilitary operations whether one form
of economic warfare or the other is most effective to support the military action may not be a critical question. The economic warfare
form selected, for example, may be one enhancing secrecy of the
military plan.
Uncertainties concerning the variations in condition and form
possible in future military \varfare; the probability, in fact, that
strategies and tactics will change in many different aspects in the
future; must necessarily qualify any judgment that economic warfare by protracted harassment in a military context is obsolete. Since
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diverse requirements, other than simple effectiveness of the action,
have been imposed upon economic 'varfare in a secondary policy role
in the past, one may expect these requirements to be equally diverse
in the future.
But if economic warfare by protracted harassment is not fully
obsolete in a military context as a secondary policy device, protracted
harassment as a generally employed technique under these circumstances is certainly obsolescent. The patent limitations ·of economic
warfare by protracted harassment as a primary policy device, in a
military context or otherwise, have been fully detailed. The economic
sortie promises to emerge as an increasingly useful technique in military or nonmilitary contexts .....t\.nd it is in economic warfare by economic sortie that the know ledge, skills and other resources possessed
or controlled by naval officers can be used in the national interest
with maximum advantage.
B. THE NAVAL DECISION MAKER IN ECONOMIC WARFARE:
LAWMAKING DURING ADMINISTRATION

Effective development and implementation of economic warfare
policies in the future, whether economic warfare techniques are employed in a primary or secondary policy role, are likely to depend
upon the ability of the economic warfare strategist to use la,v. This
strategist will often be a naval officer-either making economic warfare decisions or ad vising others making these decisions.
An ability to use law consciously and effectively requires recognition by the strategist and others who control him that men do use
law to define ends for action and to attain these ends. Recognition
is also important that each use of a legal institution necessitates
reshaping the institution to a degree conducive to attaining the end
and fitting the ne'v factual context in 'vhich the institution is applied. Conversely, the degree of deviation from past ends or goals and
the degree of change in the factual and intellectual context in which
the policy is formulated and applied determines the degree of reshaping of the legal institution necessary to effect the policy. New "law"
is made as old "I a w" is administered.
But in this concentration upon the engineering or operational
features of "lawmaking," the-~trategist must not ignore the seismic
changes in human relations which changes in legal institutions produce. Each legal change sets in motion a complex vibration of elements in human relations. These may range from those substantially
undetectable to those that are catastrophic. The economic warfare
strategist should foresee and weigh the importance of these shifts.
To introduce the kinds of problems faced by a legal strategist in
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economic warfare, two cases ·will be presented, analyzed and compared. Both of the cases arose a few months apart in the early days
of the American Civil War. Novel fact situations were boiling up
from the breach in the country as never before in American history.
Problems of a complexity unparalleled until the present decade were
being presented for decision.
In one case, the use of law-by a General-accomplished his economic warfare object. The persons affected accepted his use of law
with varying degrees of grace. His theory was thoroughly discredited
before the Civil War \vas over. But this was not until the aim of the
General had been achieved. Indeed, his legal strategy succeeded beyond his wildest expectations.
In the second case, the use of law by a Naval Captain failed of
acceptance at the time-as did his economic warfare effort. The
Captain \vas well ahead of his day. The law he tried to make may be
the law currently. But impact upon the present, rather than upon the
future, is the aim of the legal strategist. He does not seek to erect a
legal pyramid to endure forever. He merely designs and lays the
sturdy legal foundation for a temporary structure.
I. Butler's Law of Contraband

On the day Virginia seceded from the Union in 1861, three escaped
slaves can1e within the lines of Union Major General B. F. Butler
at Fort Monroe. The slaves belonged to Colonel Mallory, Confederate
commander at Hampton. They had been used before their escape to
construct a battery at Sewall's Point.
General Butler was not a professional soldier. In his short active
service prior to secession, he had been noted for his innocence both of
the complexities of military science and tactics and of the requirements of Army Regulations. But for dealing ·with the legal complexities of slavery, he had been well trained in the rough and tumble
of the hustings in Lowell, Massachusetts, where he had practiced
law and been active in politics before achieving military high
command.
Thus, when Major Carey, commander of the Confederate picket at

Hampton, came under a flag of truce to retrieve the fugitives, Butler
was amply prepared to receive him. Assisting slaves to escape \Vas a
felony under the Fugitive Slave Law. 22 But Butler had no intention
of returning the escapees. He later described his discourse with Major
Carey as follows : 23
9 Stat. 462 (1850). The penalty for abetting the escape of a slave or withholding custody from his master was a fine not to exceed $1,000 and imprisonment not to exceed six months.
23 Butler, Butler's Book, 257 (1892).
22
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(Carey) Do you mean to set aside your constitutional obligation
to return them ?
(Butler) I mean to take Virginia at her word in the ordinance
of secession passed yesterday. I am under no constitutional obligation to a foreign country as Virginia claims to be.
(Carey) But you say \Ve cannot secede, so you cannot consistently
claim the negroes.
(Butler) But you say you have seceded, so you cannot consistently claim them. I shall hold these negroes as contraband of
war, since they are engaged in the construction of your battery
and are claimed as your property. The question is simply whether
they shall be used for or against the Government of the United
States. * * *
After Butler and Carey parted, Butler returned to his quarters,
and as he walked along with a member of his staff, he stated: 24
'* * * /T/he correctness of 1ny law \vas discussed by Major
Haggerty, who was, for a young man, a very good lawyer. He
said he doubted somewhat upon the la,v, and asked me if I knew
of that proposition having been laid down in any treatise on
international law.
'Not the precise proposition,' said I, 'but the precise principle
is familiar law. Property of whatever nature, used or capable of
being used for war like purposes, and especially when being so
used, may be captured and held either on sea or on shore as
property contraband of \Var. Whether there may be a property
in human beings is a question upon \vhich some of us might
doubt, but the rebels cannot take the negative. At any rate,
Haggerty, it is a good enough reason to stop the rebels' mouths
with, especially as I should have held these negroes anyway'.* * *
When noised abroad, Butler's decision caused a mass exodus of
slaves to Fort Monroe. There Butler promptly put them to work and
appointed a "Commissioner of Negro Affairs" to supervise them. He
then reported his action to Lieutenant General Scott with a duplicate
of his letter to the Secretary of War.
General Scott was apparently shocked into silence. The Secretary
of War responded with "no directions to pursue any different course
of action from that which I had reported to him, except that I was
to keep an accurate account of the value of their work." 25
Reflecting upon his use of lavv, which \vas received rather frigidly
in 1861 by all except the slaves, Butler stated many years later: 26
24

25
26

Ibid., 258.
Ibid., 259.
Ibid., 259.
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* * * Our troops could not act as a marshal's posse

in catching
runaway negroes to return them to their masters who were fighting us at the same time. What ought to be done? Nobody made
answer to that question. Fortuitously it was thrust upon me to
decide what must be done then and there, and very fortunately
a fe,v minutes' thought caused to flash through n1y mind the
plausible answer at least to the question: What will you do?
I do not claim for the phrase 'contraband of war,' used in this
connection, the highest legal sanction, because it would not apply
to property used or property for use in \var, as \vould a cargo of
coal being carried to be burned on board an enemy's ship of war.
To hold that contraband, as well might be done, by no means
included all the coal in the country. It \vas a poor phrase enough;
Wendell Phillips said 'a bad one'. My staff officer, Major
Winthrop, insisted it was an epigram which freed the slaves.
The truth is, as a lawyer I was never very proud of it, but as an
executive officer, I was much comforted with it as a means of
doing my duty.
With allo,vances for inaccuracies in General Butler's second
thoughts after thirty years, his formulation of "contraband" as applied to slaves \Vas an econo1nic warfare measure second in importance
only to the declaration of blockade by the Union. It was the touchstone by \vhich the Confederate labor force \vas lured away in the
eighteen months preceding the Emancipation Proclamation. During
this period, Union milita.ry and naval power was at its nadir. Butler's
economic \Varfare served in part to counterbalance the superior Confederate leadership and fighting qualities until Union military power
was fully mobilized. 27

2. Wilkes and The Trent
At the time General Butler \vas employing the slaves of Colonel
Mallory at Fort Monroe, U.S.S. ;..~an Jacinto, Lieutenant D. M. Fair27 Bruce Catton, appraising General Butler's use of law a century later, sees
effects in his decision beyond the prosaic margin of economic duress. He writes:
* * * Meanwhile, other men would have their say. One of them was Ben
Butler, of Massachusetts, a man seemingly appointed now, in the infinite
Providence of God, to cast his own strange ray of revealing light on the
way the war must go. To the relief of everyone, Butler had been lifted out
of Maryland and had been set down by the Federal War Department, at
Fort Monroe, at the tip of the Virginia Peninsula. Here, trying to be an
administrator and a warrior, succeeding Imperfectly in each, he would
bring up for definition the thing both sides did not want mentioned just
now-the deep underlying wrong of slavery. Meaning nothing more than
a good lawyer's shrewdness, he helped to define the war. * * *. Catton,
The Coming Fury, 394 (1961).

51
£ax commanding, was cruising the West Coast of Africa on the hunt
for slavers.28 Captain Charles Wilkes, a veteran officer, explorer of
the Antarctic, pacifier of the Fij is, discoverer of Wake Island, a
scientist of great merit who prepared charts later used by the United
States Navy in the South Pacific in 'Vorld War II, but 'vithal a
brilliant enigma, assumed command of San Jacinto in August. His
orders were to return to the United States to participate in the
DuPont Expedition against Port Royal. 2 u The attack upon Port
Royal was scheduled for November 4, 1861.
Delaying his return in a fruitless search for the Confederate
cruiser Sumter, Wilkes touched at Cienfuegos, Cuba. There he
learned from a newspaper that Mason and Slidell, Confederate Commissioners, had reached Havana by blockade runner.
Hastening to Havana to capture the blockade runner on its return,
but arriving too late, Wilkes nevertheless discovered through the
agency of Lieutenant Fairfax, now his executive officer, 'vho talked
to Mason in a Havana hotel, that the Commissioners, their secretaries
and families, 'vere to sail on the British steamer Trent on N ovember 4, 1861, for St. Thomas en route to Europe. Mason, posted to
England, and Slidell, posted to France, were to negotiate for recognition of the Confederacy.
In his report to Secretary of the Navy Welles, made on 16 N ovem28

Lieutenant Fairfax was a Virginian who had been appointed a midshipman
from North Carolina. He had taken part in the capture of Lower California
during the Mexican "\Var. At the Trent incident Lieutenant Fairfax was forty
years old and had been a Lieutenant since 1851.
His subsequent service for the Union was highly distinguished. He was in
command of Cayuga with Farragut at New Orleans in 1862 and commanded
the monitor Nantucket in DuPont's attack on Charleston in 1863. Fairfax became a Rear Admiral after the war. He died in 1894.
29 For a biography of Wilkes, see Henderson, The Hidden Coasts
(1953).
Although his failure to report for the DuPont Expedition against Port Royal
is puzzling, Wilkes has been handled with unnecessary roughness for his part
in the Trent affair. This stems in part from the scathing indictment of his conduct by Admiral Porter in his Naval History of the Civil War, 63 et seq.
(1886), and critical comments by Professor Soley in The Blockade and The
Cruisers, 176 et seq. (1890).
Correspondence and reports filed concerning the Trent may be found in
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the TVar of the Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 1, 12& et seq. (1894), referred to hereafter as Official
Records. Additional correspondence may be found in Harris, The Trent Affair

(1896).
A recent and lively account of the incident may be found in I Jones, The
Civil War at Sea, 292 et seq. (1960). Jones states a search was made for
dispatches on the 1 rent. This was not the case, there being no examination
even of the baggage of the Commissioners until they arrived in Boston. Their
baggage was then examined by orders of Colonel Dimick at Fort Warren.
1
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ber 1861, Captain Wilkes stated the process by which he arrived at
his decision to seize the Commissioners: 30
* * * When I heard at Cienfuegos, on the south side of Cuba,
of these commissioners having landed on the island of Cuba, and
that they were at the Havannah, and would depart in the English
steamer on the 7th of November, I deter1nined to intercept them,
and carefully examined all the authorities on international la\v
to which I had access, viz, l{ent, Wheaton, Vattel, besides various decisions of Sir William Scott and other judges of the
admiralty court of Great Britain, which bore upon the rights of
neutrals and their responsibilities.
The governments of Great Britain, France and Spain having
issued proclamations that the Confederate States were viewed,
considered and treated as belligerents, and knowing that the
ports of Great Britain, France, Spain and Holland in the vVest
Indies \vere open to their vessels, and they were admitted to all
the courtesies and protection vessels of the United States received, every aid and attention being given the1n, proved clearly
that they acted under this vie\v and decision, and brought them
within the internationalla\v of search and under the responsibilities. I therefore felt no hesitation in boarding and searching all
vessels of \vhatever nation I £ell in \vith, and have done so.
The question arose in my mind whether I had the right to
capture the persons of these co1nmissioners, whether they were
amenable to capture. There was no doubt I had the right to
capture vessels \vith written dispatches; they were expressly referred to in all authorities, subjecting the vessel to seizure and
condemnation if the captain of the vessel had knowledge of their
being on board, but these gentlemen were not dispatches in the
literal sense, and did not seem to come under that designation,
and nowhere could I find a case in point. That they were commissioners, I had ample proof from their O\Vll a vo\val, and bent
on mischievous and traitorous errands against our country, to
overthro\v its institutions and enter into treaties and alliallces
with foreign states, expressly forbidden by the Constitution. * * *

I then considered them as the embodiment of dispatches, and
as they had openly declared themselves as charged \vith all
authority from the Confederate Government to form treaties
and alliances tending to the establishment of their independence,
I became satisfied that their mission \vas adverse and criminal
to the Union, and it therefore became my duty to arrest their
progress and capture them, if they had no passports or papers
ao Official Records, 143.
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from the Federal Government, as provided for under the law of
nations, viz, that foreign ministers of a belligerent on board of
neutral ships are required to possess papers from the other
belligerent to permit them to pass free. * * *
Wilkes did not disclose his plan to any of his officers until San
Jacinto sailed from Havana on November 2. H e then disclosed his
plan to Lieutenant Fairfax. Many years later, Lieutenant Fairfax
wrote: 31
When Captain 1Vilkes first took me into his confidence, and
told me what he proposed to do, I earnestly reminded hi1n of the
great risk of war ·with these two governments, supported as they
were by powerful navies. * * *
On November 3, Wilkes put into Key West, searching for other
vessels which might aid him in intercepting T1·en t. Fairfax there
suggested he consult with Judge Marvin, United States District
Judge in l{ey West , " one of the ablest maritime lawyers," but Fairfax noted : 32
* * * I soon saw * * * that he had made up his mind to intercept and capture the 1 rent as well as to take possession of the
Commissioners, and I therefore ceased to discuss the matter. * * *
Wilkes then took station in the old Bahama channel and intercepted Trent on November 8. Fairfax "\vrites: 33
* * * As the next in rank to Captain Wilkes, I claimed the
right to board the mail packet. Captain Wilkes fully expected
that I "\Vould tender my services for this 'delicate duty' and
rather left to me the plan for carrying out his instructions. * * *
The instructions issued to Lieutenant Fairfax ·were in part: 34
* * * You will have the second and third cutters of this ship
fully manned and armed, and be in all respects prepared to
board the stea1ner Trent, now hove to under our guns. On boarding her you .will demand the papers of the steamer, her clearance
from Havana, with the list of passengers and crew. Should
Mr. Mason, Mr. Slidell, Mr. Eustis, and Mr. Macfarland be on
board, you will take them prisoners and send them on board this
ship immediately, and take possession of her as a prize. I do not
deem it will be necessary to use force, that the prisoners will
have the good sense to avoid any necessity for using it, but if
they should, they must be made to understand that it is their
own fault. They must be brought on board.
All trunks, cases, packages and bags belonging to them you
1
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II Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 136 (1884).
II Battles and Leaders of the CivillVa·r, 135, 136 (1884).
aa Ibid., 136.
34 Official Records, 131.
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will take possession of, and send on board this ship. Any dispatches found on the persons of the prisoners, or in possession
of those on board the steamer, \viii be taken possession of also,
examined and retained if necessary. * * *
But Fairfax states he decided: 35
* * * IN I ot to do anything unnecessary in the arrest of these
gentlemen, or anything that ·would irritate the Captain of the
Trent, or any of his passengers, particularly the commissionerslest it occur to them to thro\v the steamer on my hands, which
\Vould necessitate my taking her as a prize. * * *
When he boarded Trent, and arrested Mason and Slidell and their
secretaries, Lieutenant Fairfax acted tactfully and \vith forebearance.
His forebearance was such that he neither insisted upon examining
the papers and passenger list of the vessel, \V hen the n1aster refused
his request, nor did he conduct a search for dispatches. Dispatches in
fact were on board and were delivered ultimately in England by a
Confederate agent. So great \Vas the disorder among the passengers
on Trent and so uncooperative were the at6tudes of her officers that
Fairfax was relieved to be able to remove the commissioners, their
secretaries and their baggage \vithout physical violence.
When he returned to San Jacinto Lieutenant Fairfax reported to
Captain vVilkes that he: 36
* * * IHiad not taken the Trent as a prize, as he had instructed
me to do, giving certain reasons \vhich satisfied him; for he
replied, 'inasmuch as you have not taken her, you \villlet her go'
or 'proceed on her voyage'. To make clear one of these relf§ons,
I should before have mentioned that Captain vVilkes, while at
Havana, had learned more definitely of DuPont's fleet, from
which he inferred its destination, for of the Southern ports the
larger vessels could only enter Port Royal. He directed me 'to
refit our battery and get the San Jacinto ready in all respects
for battle' adding that he would 'join DuPont in time to cooperate with him'. (As it \vas, Port Royal fell the day before
we boarded the Trent, as \Ve learned on our arrival off
Charleston.)
The reasons I assigned to Captain "'\Vilkes for my action were:
First, that the capture of the 1 rent would make it necessary to
put a large prize cre\v (officers and men) on board, and thus
materially \veaken our battery for use at Port Royal; secondly,
that as there were a large number of women and children and
mails and specie bound to various ports, the capture \Vould
1

35
36

II Battle8 and Leaders of the Civil War, 135, 136 (1884).
Ibid., 140.

55

seriously inconvenience innocent persons and merchants ; so that
I had determined before taking her to lay this matter before
him for serious consideration.
I returned immediately to the T'f'lent and informed Captain
Moir that Captain Wilkes would no longer detain him and he
might proceed on his voyage.
Fairfax added: 37
I gave my real reasons some weeks afterward to Secretary
Chase, whom I met by chance at the Treasury Department, he
having asked me why I did not obey Captain Wilkes' instructions. I told him it was because I 'vas impressed with England's
sympathy for the South, and felt she would be glad to have so
good a ground to declare war against the United States.
When the Commissioners were taken, the military fortunes of the
Union were at a low ebb. The need in the North f<Jt: a hero was great.
Captain Wilkes promptly received public acclaim. But his fall from
official grace, if not in public exaltation, was rapid when the Trent
affair received a second look.
Secretary Welles was mildly reserved and apprehensive from the
beginning. Montgomery Blair sourly suggested that Wilkes be required to transport the Commissioners to England. Secretary
Seward wrote the United States Ambassador at the Court of
St. James that Wilkes had seized the passengers without instructions
and the matter had not been discussed in the Cabinet.
European lawyers regarded seizure of the Commissioners as a violation of international la·w. The British, without waiting for diplomatic adjustment, commenced preparations for war.
Secretary Seward, in December, stated to the British that Wilkes
had acted without orders and had erred in failing to bring the Trent
in for adjudication. The Commissioners and their secretaries were
released with their baggage, delivered to a British vessel, and continued their missions. 38
An emotional atmosphere which eased the labors of Confederate
supply agents developed in both England and France. The antislavery bias of the European bourgeois was counteracted to a degree
by concern over vVilkes' apparent adaptation of the high-handed
British treatment of neutral shipping.
Riding a wave of popular -~cclaim, Wilkes obtained a promotion
and command of the James River Flotilla. Shortly thereafter he
ended his naval career in command of the West Indies Squadron,
Idem, 40, fn.
A discussion of the efforts of Mason and Slidell upon reaching their posts
may be found in Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 224 et seq. (1931).
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being harried down in 1863 by the British and relieved from command for diplomatic reasons.
3. Lawmaking by Butler and Wilkes Compared

Unlike the law made by Butler, which proved effective economic
warfare for the Union, the law made by Captain Wilkes was a pplauded in the North but then repudiated by his contemporaries. His
seizure of Trent did nothing to advance the political cause of the
Union. Why did one decision serve the cause supported and the other
not?
Butler was using law from the time he started speculating upon
alternatives open for the disposition of Colonel Mallory's slaves. He
appraised instinctively the competing interests involved and considered how his possible decisions might be received by the persons
affected.
Colonel Mallory could not sue Butler in a Northern Court. He
might sue in a Southern Court if Butler were captured, if the Confederacy won, or if the slaves were not emancipated. These possibilities seemed comfortably remote. 39
No foreign o\vners were involved. Although Colonel Mallory
might be considered a foreign owner, there was no chance that his
claim might be adjudicated before an international tribunal or that
he could persuade England, France or some other third state to
espouse his claim.
Butler may have committed a felony under Federal Law by refusing to return th~ slaves. But this was a matter of interpretation of
the Fugitive Slave Law, \vhich did not cover specifically the case of
"contraband" slaves. The United States Attorney General was not
likely to prosecute Butler for a violation of the law in any event.
The Fugitive Slave Law was a "Southern" ~aw and unenforcible in
the North in 1861. Butler, a senior l\1ajor General and a prominent
Massachusetts Democrat to boot, was hardly a target for a Republican Attorney General at a time \vhen the Republicans were seeking
Northern Democratic support.
Judicial review of his action being unlikely, Butler's only concern
was with administrative review by his superiors. This review might
be sought by the Confederates, on the theory Butler had violated
the rules of land warfare by taking private property, or perhaps by
antislavery or proslavery elements in the North disapproving his
decision.
Butler was sued after the war for a number of actions taken during his
command at New Orleans, including looting the sword of General Twiggs. He
defended these actions successfully.
39
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Quite clearly he would have ad1ninistrative problems if he gave
the fugitives back; and ·would have political problems, as well, if he
ran for post,var office in Massachusetts. He thus decided to retain
the slaves and probed for doctrine upon which to rest his case.
Butler exaggerates when he suggests in his memoir that the "contraband" analogy simply popped into his mind during his argument
with Major Carey. The Confederates treated slaves as property for
some purposes and not for others. A slave was property and could
be transferred. But a slave was counted as a person for apportioning
Congressmen.
These and other inconsistencies in the slave law had been publicized before the 'var. Butler simply played upon the fact that this
inconsistency had progressed to the margin of logical tolerance.
Contraband, then and no,v, is lin1ited to property. I£ the Confederates contended the slaves were not contraband, an inference
might be drawn that the slaves were not property, since Butler could
prove hostile use if not interception during carriage.
Too many distinctions concerning the legal status of slaves had
been made before 1861. Few officials, North or South, other than
Butler, were prepared to "rock the boat." His formula effectively, as
Butler crudely put it, "stopped the rebels' mouths."
Butler might have called "a spade a spade" and declared the slaves
captured public property, like captured pieces of artillery. They had
been converted to the public use of the Confederacy for work upon
fortifications. But the United States might find itself with title. This
would be embarrassing.
I£ Butler declared the slaves captured private property, the United
States might have to offer indemnity to their owner after the war.
About thirty years before the United States had argued successfully
before the Tsar of Russia as arbitrator that England was liable for
slaves carried a'vay during the vVar of 1812.
"Contraband" was a happy inaccuracy. Title to the slaves was left
in suspense. The abolitionists (other than Wendell Phillips) temporarily were satisfied in Butler's 1\tfassachusetts constituency. Officials in Washington, yet unready to emancipate the slaves, were
mollified. The rebels' "mouths were stopped." Butler's retention of
the slaves for work at Fort Monroe and a program of further
attrition of the Confederate labor force were justified.
His allegedly ad hoc formula, although unsound analytically, and
given harsh treatment by legal scholars since, 'vorked admirably as
an acceptable fiction until emancipation. This occurred within
eighteen months. Although Butler's formula was then obsolete, it
stands as his most enduring monument.
No one can say with assurance today why Captain Wilkes felt
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bound to seize the Commissioners on the Trent when he should have
been on his way instead to join the DuPont Expedition. Some writers
have suggested he sought an opportunity for a dramatic act before
his retirement, 'vhich he then believed was pending. Quite possibly
his decision was conditioned by an element of Anglophobia, shared
by many American naval officers of his generation, and sharpened
both by his disputes 'vith Ross concerning their conflicting claims to
discoveries in the Antarctic and by his kinship with John Wilkes,
the persecuted British editor. 40 His boyhood friendship with Slidell,
superseded by frigidity as the prospect of secession loomed, may have
had some bearing.
But clearly Captain Wilkes, unlike General Butler, had no feel
for the way in which law worked or for the dimensions of the political context in which his decision was made. This was not his fault.
He was a naval officer and scientist-not a lawyer. Commanders
afloat at the time the Commissioners ·were seized had no instructions
by the Navy Department concerning neutral rights.
The Secretary of the Navy could not, of course, have foreseen the
necessity of haste to convey such instructions to Wilkes. He believed
Wilkes was joining the DuPont Expedition and not on a junket of
his own, pursuing British packets.
Wilkes could not reasonably consult 'vith Judge Marvin as Lieutenant Fairfax suggested. Judge Marvin would be judge of the prize
court before which Trent ·would be brought if seized. If Judge
Marvin disqualified himself, T1•ent 'vould have to be carried by its
prize crew to a less convenient port.
As Wilkes saw the matter, law was an obstacle standing between
him and the Commissioners. If he could find a hole through this
obstacle, like a break in the pack ice through which he ">drove his'
wooden ships in his exploring days in Antarctica, he could pass
through and seize the Commissioners.
He found this hole in the treatment of dispatches by Sir William
Scott. But instead of seeking a principle underlying Scott's decisions,
as Butler probably would have done, Wilkes 'vorked solely by factual
analogy, identifying written dispatches with dispatches borne in the
cortical processes of the Commissioners.
This was a bold scientific approach to the matter; but one 'vhich
would have had more appeal in 1961 than in 1861. Furthermore,
Wilkes seemingly gave no consideration at any stage of the transac40 John Wilkes, great uncle of the Captain, was editor and owner of the newspaper, The North Briton. Wilkes was imprisoned in 1763 for a libel upon
George III and became both odious to the monarchists and a hero in the
colonies. Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is named for Wilkes and Issac Barre, his
contemporary in Parliament who also supported colonial claims.
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tion to the possible responses of persons with interests in the conflict
to his interception and treatment of Trent, her cre'v and passengers.
The matter, as Wilkes saw it, was one between the authorities on
international law 'vhich he consulted and his conscience as a patriot.
When these could be reconciled, he regarded his legal problem as
settled. He viewed law as an obstacle and legal skill as a tool to force
an entrance. He failed to recognize a problem in "legal strategy" or
management-and this problem as a continuing one, not to be solved
by any single decision.
His decision to intercept 1 rent required more than a single mental
act. Wilkes should also have set the factual matrix for authoritative
decisions by others and been prepared to persuade others to accept
his treatment of the facts.
Setting this factual matrix required his careful supervision of
Lieutenant Fairfax, his boarding officer. Fairfax, a seasoned officer,
was an aggressive advisor. Wilkes should have recognized that Fairfax was seeking to impose his own policy upon his commander by
setting his own factual matrix. I£ Fairfax failed to inspect Trent for
dispatches and contraband items and failed to seize Trent when the
Commissioners ·were discovered on board, Wilkes should have ordered
him back with the force to do these things.
The requirement under the circumstances for an adjudication was
also clear. Wilkes' failure to go beyond a simple factual analogy in
making his decision-his failure to analyze even the interests involved
in the confrontation-could have been compensated to a degree by
review of the facts by an impartial judge. In 1861, this required
seizure of Trent and her diversion to Key West, or some other
port, where the propriety of the interdiction could be passed upon
by a judge having admiralty jurisdiction.
Wilkes had directed Fairfax to seize Trent. But his failure to
insist upon compliance with his order meant that Fairfax, who
either misunderstood or disapproved the treatment of law by Wilkes,
set a factual matrix placing Wilkes and his superiors in an untenable position.41
1

4. The Naval Officer and Legal Strategy in Economic Warfare

A naval officer may participate in legal strategy in economic warfare in a context other than that illustrated by Wilkes' interception
of Trent. He may, for example, participate in "lawmaking" on a
formal level.
.u It has been argued that war with England was avoided by the Union
because Trent was not seized and diverted. An adjudication, however, would
have provided a quick settlement of the issues and one probably satisfactory
both to the Union and England.
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The officer may serve as a member o£ a court or commission dealing with a narrow issue produced by economic warfare. He may
serve as a delegate to an inte,rnational convention considering legal
problems produced by economic warfare in a broader perspective.
Usually, however, the naval officer's £unction in lawmaking on a
"formal" level will be indirect or advisory. Thus, he may testify
before a Congressional Committee which seeks to define an econo1nic
warfare problem and devise legislation to be used in an effort to solve
it. His experience with similar problems and ways to solve them
may be reflected in the report o£ the Committee and ultimately
influence laws passed by the Congress.
In his appearances as a witness before Courts, the ability o£ a
naval officer to influence the development o£ law relating to economic
warfare is appreciably less than before legislative Co1nmittees. Not
only are the issues before Courts typically narrow, but rules o£ evideuce and limitations upon the la·wmaking £unctions o£ a Court may
limit the ability o£ the officer to express his views freely. His judicial
influence thus tends to be negative.
In the Oorfu Ohannel Oase, for example, the refusal o£ a British
naval witness to divulge the contents o£ British secret Order XCU
may have prevented the International Court o£ Justice from introducing into international la·w the civil la". . doctrine o£ "misuse o£ a
right.'' This doctrine "\Vas discussed in the dissenting opinion o£
Judge Alvarez. 42 "Negative influence" is an in1portant £unction in
the pre£ormulatory stage o£ lawmaking .....t\..t this stage poor or unworkable policies can be stifled at birth.
But while lawmaking through administration is the 1nost important and obvious way in which a naval officer may become involved
in legal strategy in economic "\Var£are, this area o£ legal activity,
paradoxically, has been the most difficult £or 1nilitary officers and
their civilian superiors to comprehend and appreciate. In dealing
with Trent, Captain "'Vilkes and Lieutenant Fairfax sensed this lawmaking £unction on1y dimly. Not 1nany military officers o£ their day
possessed the flair £or management of law and flawless effrontery
which served General B. F. Butler "\Vell in many trying situat'ions.
It has been pointed out hitherto in this Chapter that certain
advantages stem £rom the use o£ economic sorties as preferred economic warfare techniques. Economic sorties also are managed most
readily at low policy-making levels.
One reason £or this flexibility at low policy levels is that legal
I.C.J. Rep., 1949, Judgment of April 9, 1949 (Merits) 48. "* * * ;r;n
virtue of the law of social interdependence * * * misuse of a right should be
transported into international law."
42
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doctrine, much of it having been developed in defensive economic
'varfare and thus not amenable to ready use in offense, becomes increasingly difficult to relate to any policy process as the facts of a
specific conflict are approached. The lo,ver the policy level of the
administrator, the greater his independence to take immediate action
to deal with facts confronting him.
But while this "lo'v level" ad1ninistrator can take immediate action, which policy makers on high levels may be unable to do 'vith
equal speed, he bears the burden of limited factual perspective. He
has difficulty, for example, in relating the action 'vhich he undertakes ,vith other action planned or undertaken at the same time.
It is not enough for hin1 to assume that current national legal
doctrine or international legal doctrine is keyed to economic warfare
by protracted harassment; and that econon1ic sorties, by presenting
situations to 'vhich the existing legal doctrine is inapposite, will give
him freedon1 of action. He 'vill find, instead, that legal institutions
are being used at various levels of authority to coordinat,e action,
persuade allies and adversaries, and guide subordinates; and, in this
process, legal doctrine (or formal staten1ents of authoritative policy)
are being formulated, revised and abandoned constantly.
Thus, while a naval officer at a relatively lo'v policy-making level
may enjoy some freedon1 of action through the e1nployment of economic sorties, his skill in the use of law to persuade his superiors
and adversaries to accept his economic action also plays a vital role.
Likewise, it is incun1bent upon his superiors to ensure that the "lo'v
level" policy maker in immediate contact 'vith the conflict events
has adequate intelligence of plans and concomitant action to permit
his rational choice of economic warfare alternatives.
The "low level" policy maker, the usual policy position of a naval
officer engaging in economic warfare, finds himself pushed to,vards
legal strategy of a defensive nature. He has 1nuch latitude for initiative but must be prepared to defend the economic action which he
undertakes. He becomes a la 'vmaker to the extent his action is accepted by those who can make authoritative decisions concerning the
conflict. The naval officer is a decision maker-but seldom does he
make final decisions. This Wilkes forgot and Butler remembered.
What are the basic features of this administrative process in economic warfare? What are the principal problems of persuasion confronting a naval officer discharging economic warfare duties ?

The Administration of E cono1nic Warfare Policies
The policies which a naval officer will have to apply or consider in
conducting economic ·warfare, whether these are described as "policies," "laws," "directives" or "orders,~' may be viewed functionally as
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"activating," "limiting" or "deactivating." This functional description is meaningful only if "la 'vs," "orders," or \vhatever level of
authoritative decision making is chosen, are accepted as elements of
a process for political management.
"Lawmaking," for example, describes an ~'endless chain" of interrelated decisions \vithin a group sufficiently matured to have developed a "formal authority" or "official decision issuing" institution.
The chain is endless because the effects of executing a "legal policy"
influence its appraisal and reformulation.
An "activating'' la\v is one directing someone to do something. The
actor is sometimes implied in the law and not expressed. For example, a law may state simply that if "X" does act "A," "B" and "C"
in a particular relationship, "X~' will receive a specified punislunent.
The police1nen, 1nagistrates, jailors, judges, and perhaps executioners,
who administer the. law are not specified.
On the other hand, judgments by these unmentioned persons concerning the wisdom of "activating" law and what the formal "lawmaker" intended, will condition whether a particular person in the
community is brought under the description "X" (whether the "law"
applies to him) or whether he is found to have done "A," "B" and
"C" in t he particular relationship required. The Bourbon law of
treason \vas not in fact applied to Marshal N ey if his firing squad,
through affection for him, agreed not to shoot him and permitted
him to escape.
Ho\vever, an activating la\v may designate an actor but not direct
clearly what he is to do. Instead, the la\v may prescribe a general
course of action.
This situation usually occurs when the "formal" la\vmaker appraises the facts of a problen1 as too complicated or changing too
rapidly to be handled by a detailed prescription of action. It is with
reference to this type of "activating" la\v that "limiting" laws are
of great importance.
A "limiting" law is one defining allocations of power. These,
typically, are found in national or state constitutions and in charters
of international organizations. "Limiting'' la \VS are characterized by
generalized and long-range goals, such as those expressed in the
Tenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. As the policy level
approaches the conflict events, formal allocations of power, especially
those based on legislative, judicial or executive functions, tend to
coalesce. As applied to "activating" hnvs setting forth general
prescriptions of action in complicated factual contexts, a "limiting"
law may require ascertainable standards to guide the administrator.
However, the more complicated the factual context and the closer the

63
policy maker to the conflict events, the less detailed the "limiting"
standard required.
"Deactivating" laws are those 'vhich bring obsolete, unused or
unwanted laws to an end. Terminating policy is one of the chr onic
and most difficult problems facing any community. It is not difficult
to end obsolete or unused laws. But when an unwanted law is ended,
which is neither obsolete nor unused, supporting conduct patterns
may have been built around the law and these conduct patterns
continue.
An alternative approach in terminating policy is to repeal by
accretion through administrative interpretation. The law is gradually chipped away through failures to apply it or by applications
unintended by the lawmake.r. The supporting custom may then
change gradually to conform to this changed use of law.
A naval officer conducting economic warfare usually will administer an "activating'' law or order describing him and his colleagues
as "actors" but not describing in detail the things to be done. In
operations deemed by the President to be critical to National
Security, such as the Cuban Quarantine of 1962, tightly centralized
and detailed control may be exercised. However, this centralized and
detailed control is unusual.
In typical naval economic warfare, the President might direct by
executive order the naval blockade of a designated coastline. The
time for commencement of the blockade will probably be indicated
in the order by the President and other details perhaps set forth.
Within the naval establishment blockade instructions are either
then prepared or prepared instructions are modified to apply to the
facts of the conflict. These instructions will contain more detail than
the executive order and are based upon forecasts of probable events.
The Fleet Commander charged 'vith conduct of the blockade then
issues these instructions, probably with elaborating detail, to his
subordinate commands. By the time the instructions reach the captain of a blockading vessel or the commander of a blockading aircraft, the provisions will appear in two forms.

S.tereotypes in Administrative Instructions
One form confers broad di~cretion upon the instructed officer. The
framer of instructions cannot foresee with assurance events which
might confront the administrator. .A precise directive might be obsolete when formulated. rrhe officer, consequently, must be given latitude for action. The provision is similar to an "activating law" which
describes the actor and objective of action but does not direct in
detail what the actor is to do.

64

A second form describes the action to be undertaken and the conditions for action. While the actor or actors may not be described
precisely, as in some "activating la,vs," the lo,ver the administrative
level at which instructions issue, the greater the likelihood and necessity of exact description.
Provisions may be found conforming precisely to neither of these
stereotypes. Indeed, as did Captain vVilkes in his interception of
Trent, an officer may dee1n it necessary to act without instructions.
But if instructions issue, are received and follo,ved, the distinction
between stereotypes is relevant to "la 'vmaking" functions the admin:strative officer probably will perform. These "lawmaking" functions, in turn, shape proble1ns of persuasion which 1nust be solved to
obtain formal co1nmunity responses favorable to the coercive economic measure.
The lawmaking function of the officer may be principally "legislative"-he may function as a. "rule maker." On the other hand, his
function may be principally "adjudicative"-that is, he may function
as a "rule a pplier."
With both stereotypes there is a potential requirement of "advocacy'' or "persuasion." But while the requirement of "advocacy"
may exist with both stereotypes, the policy position of the person to
be persuaded tends to differ 'vith the provision being applied.
When broad discretion is conferred by the instructions, the "lawmaking" function of the officer is primarily "legislative." He supplies necessary elmnents of an incompletely formulated policy.
"Limiting laws" may curtail the ambit of discretion to make or
complete policy which can be thus delegated or subdelegated. But
"limiting laws" are not applied stringently in the complex and
dynamic contexts in which military officers usually serve.
There is a secondary "adjudicative" lawmaking function when
broad discretion is conferred. ....L\..fter the officer supplies the policy
elements omitted by the framer of instructions, his primary function,
he then appraises the facts confronting him and decides 'vhether
and how he should act. La'v, on a modest scale, is made in the
"adjudicative" process also.
Rather than conferring broad discretion the instructions may be in
the general form: If "X~' does acts " . .L\.,"
.
"B," "C" and "D" in a
specified relationship, you 'vill then do act "E." The framer describes
the action and its conditions.
"X," "At "B," "C" and "D" will never appear in the exact form
the framer of instructions predicts. Nor will act "E" have precisely
the consequences he anticipates. If the instructions re1nain in force,
the events to which the instructions 'vere first applied and the consequences flowing therefrom will not be repeated.
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The instructed officer must thus conduct mentally an informal
trial to determine whether the conditions for act ion are met. He
attempts to foresee the probable consequences of action in the "different" context and whether these contribute to the objective sought
by the fra1ner of instructions. He, finds fa cts and relates these to the
plan he applies. The process, essentiaJly, is "adjudicative."
A "legislative" function figures in a secondary role. The instructed
officer reads meaning into the instructions from his experience. By
contracting or protracting the "\Vording of the instructions, in the
light of his factual analysis, the, officer decides whether to act-and
if he does act, whether to perform act "E" or some variation.
The only advocacy required, whether the instructions are broad or
narrow, may not exceed a simple explanation to an official superior.
But economic warfare tends to present issues of critical national and
international importance. A foundation for an argument or arguments to support favorable characterizations of the action by relevant con1munities should thus be prepared. Although the arguments
may never be advanced, they nevertheless should be available if
needed.

Rea.,sons for Concern About Futur.e Community
0 haracterizatiom of Economic Warfare
Why should a naval officer charged with conducting economic warfare be concerned with "legality" o£ his action. A judgment about
"legality" of an act when the act is done involves a forecast whether
a relevant community \viii respond to the act; whether it will respond
through use of its formal decision-making processes; and whether
the judgment of the formal authority of the community will be that
the act in question is "permissive" or "impermissive." Furthermore,
a judgment about "legality," to be meaningful to an executive officer,
must embrace a prediction w·hether the formal judgment will be
implemented, if unfavorable, by action to attenuate the effects of
the economic warfare policy considered.
Because of these variables, no one can say with assurance that an
act is "legal" or "defensible" when done. There is an element of
dynamic change both in legal institutions and the primacy of values
.sought. The "legitimacy" of action thus tends to be a product of
"persuasion" of decision makers in a particular context.
This task of persuasion is most effectively handled by legally
trained professionals. With other features in planning and executing
economic warfare dmnanding close attention by a naval officer engaged in economic warfare, how then can the time of an officer without legal training rationally be allocated to considering "legal" features of the transaction?
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One reason for attention to the legal features of an economic warfare policy at low administr~tive levels, 'vhether the policy is being
formulated or executed, is the bearing of an implemented community
determination of "impermissiveness" upon the effectiveness of the
action undertaken. Whether characterized by a community as "legal"
or "illegal," an executed economic 'varfare plan has impact upon
the environment and sets in motion a chain of events. But if an
adverse community decision is rendered and implemented these effects
may be attenuated. The degree of this attenuation depends upon
the degree of concomitance of the community decision to the economic warfare act and the intensity and skill of implementation of
the decision. I£ a community characterization is delayed, there is a
diminishing possibility that the effects of economic action can be
interrupted.
An economic sortie may avoid the full effect of an adverse community characterization. The sortie technique also tends to permit an
effective withdrawal and redirection of economic action when required by an adverse community decision. But even when economic
sorties are used, adverse community characterizations, producing
when implemented, premature or forced abandonments of policies,
also produce value losses in the state engaging in economic warfare.
When a community characterization of economic warfare is not
rendered in substantial concomitance to the event, the prospect
steadily decreases that such a decision will be rendered. Yet delayed
characterizations do occur.
Although these characterizations have little effect upon the impact
of an executed economic warfare policy, the element of delay compli:
cates fact finding when an issue of personal ci vii or criminal liability of the officer 'v ho engaged in economic warfare is presented.
Furthermore, in these delayed decisions there is a macrocosmic display of the "law-observing" image of the state waging economic
warfare.
If the state is represented as a chronic "la,vbreaker," by exaggerating the fiction of community participation in individual acts,
this adverse global publicity may affect its diplomatic posture. For
example, the delayed trial of Eichmann before an Israeli Court, involved a review, long after the events became obscure, of the antiSemitic program of Nazi Germany. The attendant publicity produced much introspection in West Germany and contributed to ultimate West. German recognition of Israel and consequent complications in West German relations with Arab States.
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What a Naval Officer Can Do About the
Legal Proble1n8 in Economic Warfare
When a naval officer is sensitive to problems of "legality" in economic warfare, he will be aware that. his is not the concern of a
bystander but the concern of an active participant. What can he do
about these "legal" problems?
First, he 1nust understand the kinds of legal problems produced
by naval activity in econon1ic warfare in the past, the community
levels at which solutions of these problems have been sought and the
shape of the co1nmunity solutions advanced. This book is devoted
principally to development of this background.
Second, he must have a thorough knowledge of his national posture
in economic coercion, both in offense and defense, with the national .
and international law bearing upon it. An understanding of his
national posture requires understanding of the econo1nic coercive
postures of the principal adversaries of his state. Community characterizations of naval action will turn primarily upon the consequences of the action; and these consequences are predictable only
when the broader context of action is grasped. A dev.elopment of this
broader context is attempted in Chapter II.
Assuming an adequate flo'v of intelligence to and from the naval
officer concerned, the background elen1ents mentioned permit conformity by the officer to past patterns of conduct to the extent current
facts and his mission permit. The greater the degree of conformity
to past conduct patterns held "legaF' or "permissive" by relevant
communities, the greater the likelihood these characterizations will
be repeated.
It is impossible to dupljcate fully these conduct patterns. Nor is
conformity frequently desirable-especially when economic warfare
is waged as a primary policy device.
The "economic sortie," an economic warfare technique recommended in this book for many applications, is a sharp departure
from traditional economic warfare postures of major Western
powers. These Western po,vers, furthermore, have been responsible
for developing.much of the international law applicable to economic
warfare.
Thus, both the planner of an economic sortie and the officer
charged with its execution must consider the extent to which the
sortie differs from conventional economic warfare postures of his
state. There is "legal" value in conformity and an element of
jeopardy in nonconformity.
But if a departure from the norm is necessary in economic warfare, the emphasis shifts from the element of repetition of conduct
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to secure favorable community characterizations to "legal strategy"
or "legal management" to secure this favorable acceptance. How does
a naval officer deal with these dynamic elements~

The Persistent Problem of PersuMion
In the moving factual frame'\vork in which he operates, a naval
officer may have to persuade a formal policy maker to accept his
action as "permissive" or "legal." More often he sets, or participates
in setting, a factual matrix as a foundation for persuasive efforts by
others.
Whether the naval officer persuades directly or prepares the foundation for persuasion by others, he 'vill be aided in his tasks by developing insights concerning three matters. First, is ability to predict the
level at '\vhich community characterizations of naval action probably
will be made. Second, is understanding retrospective aspects of community characterizations and the difficulties stemming therefrom.
Third, is appreciation of the "legal perspectives" of potential decision makers for relevant com1nunities. What is the decision maker's
understanding of "law~' '? Does he think "la 'v" is made-and, if so,
who is to make it~

Locating the Potential Derrision Maker
By far the most important step in locating potential decision
makers is anticipation by the planner or executor of conflicting demands the economic action probably will produce. I£ these demands
normally will be asserted through the institutions of the state which
the officer represents, no international decision makers are likely to
be involved. General Butler in the "contraband'' transaction carefully evaluated these interests and predicted correctly that no formal
decision concerning his action would be rendered. Captain vVilkes
failed to foresee that British claims concerning his interception of
Trent would gain support in his own country and frustrate his reasonable purpose.
The instructions, if any, under which the officer operates provide a
rough guide indicating the possible decision maker. When ai1 officer
acts without instructions, the community decisions may be made by
institutions o£ hjs o'vn state or by international organizations or by
other states. Apart from predicting the interests affected, there is
no way to forecast with assurance the community or communities for
which decisions will be rendered. Both Butler and vVilkes acted
without instructions. There was no community intervention in
Butler's case. United States authorities intervened to restore the commissioners removed from 1 rent only after a co1nplaint by England.
An officer acting pursuant to a broad grant of discretion is not
1
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likely to be questioned by his national authorities. He has been invested by these authorities with a "legislative" function. Ho,vever,
the state for which he acts may be concerned with characterizations
by international organizations or by other states. The officer also,
although infrequently, may be required to answer before an international tribunal or before a tribunal of another state.
If the officer operates under precise instructions, his lawmaking
function primarily is "adjudicative." His misconstruction or disobedience of these instructions renders him answerable to his official
superiors. It is unlikely, on the other hand, he will be tried for misconstruing, obeying or disobeying these orders by an international
tribunal or even the tribunal of an adversary.
Only a small percentage of the cases of officers acting in violation
of international conventions or custom pursuant to superior orders
were brought to trial before- international or national tribunals after
World War II. Apart from the fact that the burden of trial fell upon
the officers of defeated enemy political establishments, a case was
tried only when criminal participation by the officer seemed amply
clear. Cases involving disobedience or negligence in executing orders
were tried frequently by states of the officers concerned. Numerous
less formal disciplinary measures ·were applied.

Relevance of the Policy Level of the Decision
jJf aker to a Characterization of Economic Warfare
The factual and legal perspective of the decision maker is affected
by his policy level as is the time proximity of the decision to the
economic warfare event. The element of time proximity in turn
affects not only the process by which the decision is made, but also
the factual and legal perspective of the decision maker.
Suppose, i"or example, it became necessary in the judgment of a
destroyer com1nander, permitting no delay for instructions, to destroy
an adversary submarine in a zone of interdiction such as that estab-lished in the Cuban Quarantine of 1962. The question immediately
arises: what community or communities will make critical decisions
of "legality" or "illegality~' (or "permissiveness" or "impermissiveness" of the action) ?
The importance of this conflict, 'vhether the officer had broad discretion or opera ted subject to precise instructions, 'vill require decisions within the naval command structure and at other levels within
the Federal Executive Branch. The matter might come before Congressional Committees. Although a domestic judicial decision is
unlikely, the case might be heard before a Naval Board of Inquiry
or Court-Martial.
But these will not be the only decision-making levels at which the
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action is characterized. The broad spectrum of interests involved will
certainly elicit decisions by global and regional security organizations. The United Nations Security Council would have the case
placed before it by the adversary state. Jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice might be invoked. Ad hoc institutions created
by nonaligned states might characterize the transaction and be able
to implement the decision in various ways. The adversary state might
capture the officer or his vessel and conduct judicial proceedings.
Assuming decisions are made 'vithin the "state-community," within
the naval command structure for example, the immediate issue which
determines the bounds of inquiry ·will probably be the "reasonableness" of the officer's judgment concerning the necessity of defense of
his vessel by the means adopted. But i:f the case is brought before the
Security Council with the issue of international delinquency of the
United States placed before it, the issue probably will be whether
the force employed by the United States in the transaction in which
the submarine was destroyed was proportionate to the threat posed
by its adversary to its territorial integrity or political independence. 43
Before the Security Council, the reasonableness of decisions of
many United States officials will be considered as these bear upon
creation of the environment in which the naval clash occurred. Judgments may be rendered concerning the "necessity" and "proportionality" of the "Quarantine." The Council may consider the degree
of effort by United States officials to find and analyze relevant facts
before executing the Quarantine policy. The extent of their deference
to international law as a coordinating scheme to minimize conflict
with the adversary and the degree of their moderation in response
to coercion may also be in issue.
The policy level thus tends to determine the "legal doctrine" applied as a standard of judgment. This doctrine tends to determine
the scope of factual inquiry.
Decisions in the state of the officer who has taken the action are
likely to be made in greater concomitance to the events. The element
of retrospectivity in characterizing the act 'vill have, for this reason,
A state may resist by employing force proportionate to an imminent threat
to its territorial integrity or political independence. E.g., Bowe, Self Defense in
International Law, 8-27 (1958) ; Brownlie, International Law and the Use of
Force by States, 251-79 (1963) ; McDougal & Feliciano, Law and Minimum
World Public Order, 217-32 (1961). The decision to employ force must be
'reasonable under the circumstances attending the threat. Under the imperfect
system of international police of coercive acts now prevailing, a provisional
decision to use force may be made and executed consistently with the United
Nations Charter when the necessity is clear to the state officials responsible for
acting.
43
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less effect than if the decision is delayed and rendered by a global or
regional authority.
If broad discretion has been conferred upon the officer sinking the
submarine, his primary la,vmaking function is "legislative." His
official superiors in his state-community may characterize his action
as "lawful" or "permissive"; 'vhereas decision makers representing a
global community may identify the action of the officer with that of
the state and characterize the action as "unlawful."
If the lawmaking function of the officer is primarily "adj udicative," the officer may encounter difficulty with his official superiors if
he deviates too far from his instructions. Yet he may not have
deviated so far as to be unable to plead superior orders either in
defense or mitigation before an international tribunal.

Retro8pectiroe Aspects of Community
Characterization of Ec01tomic Warfare
An officer commanding a ship on blockade, when intercepting a
vessel threatening a blockade breach, makes a decision based upon a
retrospective consideration of facts. He isolates and temporarily
crystallizes in his mind facts in a relationship imposed by his perspective. This perspective may be broadened or narrowed by predictions of probable future events and information concerning concomitant events developed by the officer or communicated to him by his
intelligence service. But the process must be performed without delay
for detailed study and deliberation. The decision is based upon a
"segmented judgment of fact." It is, however, only one decision in a
closely meshed series.
The factual context is dynamic. The officer involved is trained to
make supplementary decisions in rapid succession. While each decision is based upon a "segmented judgment of fact," the rapid building of one decision upon another minimizes the factual obsolescence
in each decision. Each decision is obsolete when made-but the effects
of the decision are assessed with such rapidity and a new decision
made with sueh promptness that a rational general direction of action
is maintained.
Community characterizations of naval decisions share the common
element of retrospection. But due to the typically greater time lag
between the community characterization and the event in question
than between decisions made by a naval officer conducting economic
warfare, a community characterization tends to be distorted by
faetual obsolescence. Not only does the community decision tend to
be "out-of-date" ".,.hen rendered, but maintaining a rational policy
orientation through succe.ssive decisions is difficult. This rational
policy orientation is difficult because community decisions are ren-
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dered by uncoordinated authorities (at national and international
levels for example) ; with differing factual perspectives, stemming
from the policy level of decision; and at erratic time intervals.
Factual obsolescence accentuates the diversities in policy produced by
the level of authority of the decision maker.
The process by 'vhich a coinmunity characterization is formulated
is also affected by the time lag between the community decision and
the events giving rise to it. In community decisions substantially conteinporaneous 'vith the events, 'vhich include most of the characterizations by national authorities and soine ]nternational characterizations as 'vell, the "segmented judgments of fact," stemming from the
close scrutiny of economic 'varfare transactions permitted by modern
communications, produce tendencies to prejudge the issues. Issues are
defined and prejudgments n1ade as the events unfold.
These tentative judgments are related by decision makers to the
factual spectrum defined by their particular perspectives when an
authoritative characterization of the events becomes necessary. However, this element of prejudgment (or bias), an element which
Western legal cultures seek to exclude in domestic judicial processes,
works in favor of rational characterizations of economic warfare.
The decision makers share the experience and understand the problems of planners and executors of economic warfare policies. The
"judge" can put himself in the position of the actor when judging his
action. If the judge and the judged share this common skein of
experience, prediction of the probable community characterization
becomes simpler on the part of the naval policy maker or executor
and the ground,vork for persuasion of the decision maker can be
laid accordingly. Most of the community decisions 'vith 'vhich a
naval officer will be concerned are those generally contemporaneous
with the eeonomic warfare events.
But suppose the important community decision in the particular
context is not one substantially contemporaneous with the economic
warfare events. The greater the time lag between the economic warfare events and the community characterization, the more detached
personally from the events the decision maker is likely to be. The
process of "segn1ented judgments of fact" decreases in importance
as an element of the ult]mate decision as the personal knowledge of
the events by the decision maker diminishes, his perspective broadens
and his factual horizon recedes.
Disassociation of the judge from the events reduces bias. But this
disassociation also makes it difficult to apply standards of judgment
involving subjective features. The judge can no longer put himself
in the position of the actor.
In "delayed" retrospective decisions, the tendency has been to
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develop standards in which objective features dominate. For example, disputes concerning claims to territory or natural resources are
often submitted for adjudication long after the disputes arise. The
standard for decision stresses manifestations of effective control over
the territory and resources. 'These are objective features. The "reasonableness" of the clai1ns or the "intents" with which the claims
were asserted involve subjective features not subject 'vhen much
time has passed, to effective exploration. Personal contact of judges
and witnesses with the events 'viii be. re1note. Recollections will have
faded.
International legal doctrine3 typically invoked soon after the
events, such as "rights of self-defense," tend to take into account the
perspectives and performances of the actors to a greater degree than
do doctrines typically invoked long after the events have transpired.
In retrospective decisions of later vintage, the inquiry 'viii be directed
towards objective factors. The question will then be framed in terms
of "intervention," "aggression," "unneutral acts" or similar high
order abstractions. An effort will be made to pour meaning into the
terms by relating them objectively to verifiable events.
An exception to this general pattern of delayed decision making
has been the handling of individual responsibility for crjminal acts
in international law. 'Typical have been cases involving 'var crimes
and crimes against humanity. In many of these, "superior orders"
have been offered by the accused either in defense or in mitigation of
punishment.
When "superior orders'' "\Vere urged in defense or mitigation of
punishment, the accused 'vas expected to show he had acted "reasonably" in relying upon and obeying the order. The tribunal passed
upon this subjective element of the defense.
Some orders were held by the tribunals to be prima facie illegalseemingly upon the theory any reasonable man ought to sense the
element of illegality. 44 There 'vas also a judgment of "reasonableness" in passing upon the response of the accused to an illegal order.
The accused was expected to have made a reasonable determination
of the probable force to be used against him if he disobeyed. 45 When
an illegal order 'vas issued as a reprisal, the accused 'vas expected to
make a reasonable judgment of the necessity and proportionality of
the act ordered. 4 6
44

See Trial of Wielen, 11 War Orimes Reports, 31, 46-47 (1947) ; Trial of
Renoth, 11 War Crimes Reports, 76, 78 (1946).
45
See Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supp. B at 53-54 (1948) ; The German
High Command Trial, 12 War Cr·imes Reports, 1, 72 (1948).
4{j See Trial of Von Falkenhorst, 11 War Crimes Reports, 18 (1946).
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Rational decisions were rendered by applying a "reasonableness"
standard in ·war crimes and related cases conducted during World
War II hostilities or within a few years thereafter. Many of the
judges and prosecutors were military personnel. They had served
under the same pressures described by the accused in defense or
mitigation of punishment.
But as time passed, "reasonableness" continued as a standard for
judgment. Advantages ·were produced by the delay. The element o£
bias or prejudgment probably diminished. Emotion which charged
earlier trials had dissipated. The loss of evidence by reason of the
time lag was more than compensated by evidence which could not
have been produced had the case been tried during or soon after the
war. Yet the impracticality of the "reasonableness" standard as a
guide for judgments rendered long after the events led to the surreptitious introduction of standards of simple political expediency
when the case was decided. 47 'These standards of political expediency
obviously cannot be forecast when economic warfare is conducted.
When a naval officer conducts economic warfare, the defensive
aspects of his legal strategy, directed to contemporaneous community
characterizations of his action or to remote characterization potentially involving objective standards, should emphasize his control
over the factual 1natrix upon ·w hich the decisions will tend to rest.
This control by the officer over the factual matrix quite obviously
will not be complete. Decisions other than his O"\Vn may appear relevant in retrospect. Of many of these he may be unaware when he
acts.
This tendency of the facts to escape his control will be compensated, however, by the "segmented" factual process by which con~
temporaneous judgments are based and by the latitude for shifting
the perspective (factual and legal) of the community decision maker
afforded by his persuasive ability and that of legally trained professionals who assist him.
Control over the faetual matrix becomes of decreased importance
in relation to delayed decisions in which subjective standards for
judgment purportedly are applied. As pointed out, the decision
maker may diverge from the standard stated and apply unpredictable
standards which are not articulated. The stated basis for judgment,
for example, may be the unreasonableness of reliance by the officer
upon a superior order. But the actual basis may be a judgment that
it is inexpedient in the general community to permit a state to concentrate in a single person the powers the officer was authorized to
47

See Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil
(1963) passim for an exploration of these problems in the highly publicized
Eichmann trial.
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exercise. The officer may be penalized as a symbol o£ the delinquency
of his state-community.
In the defensive aspects of legal strategy, viewed from the level
of the naval executor, judgments about the legal perspectives of
potential community authorities who may characterize the action are
important elements in planning and executing economic warfare. The
importance is greater in relation to delayed characterizations involving subjective standards than in characterizations o£ other types.

Perspectives About Law and Lawmaking
In a delayed decision involving subjective standards, the outcome
might turn upon the predisposition of the decision maker concerning
how power should be allocated in the community he represents. As
applied to the extensive administrative "lawmaking" functions involved in planning and executing economic warfare, the decision
might rest upon ho1JJ much la 'v the decision maker thought had been
made and who, in his community, he thought should make it.
A person recognizing elements of change in legal institutions and
in the primacy of values sought through these will recognize the role
of persuasion and the concept of managen1ent in dealing 'vith problems possibly amenable to solution by legal devices. 'A person visualizing legal principles, bearing upon means and ends, as statio elements, will deny law is managed or that persuasion is a dominant
element in the process of making a decision in a legal context. Authorities holding both vie·ws, and expressing various shades of
opinion related to these views, will make critical community characterizations of economic warfare.
The problem of persuasion thus involves convincing a decision
maker that: ( 1) legal institutions and the primacy of values sought
through these. can and do change; (2) these changes can be initiated
on an administrative level; and ( 3) the changes so initiated are
compatible with the value preferences of the community whose authority passes upon the economic action.
The three basic perspectives about law and lawmaking with which
a legal strategist in economic warfare may have to deal may be
described for present purposes as "paleofundamentalist," "neofunclamentalist" and ·"behavioristic." The first two perspectives have been
and are still closely allied with religious tenets. There has been much
feeding of ideas back and forth between legal and religious systems.
Behavioristic perspectives are based upon methods developed largely
during the late 19th and 20th centuries for the study of human relations. Psychological and sociological materials are stressed and
much value is placed in methodology. Currently, either paleofundamentalistic or neofundamentalist legal perspectives are those most
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likely to be encountered among community decision makers, although
behavioristic schools are attracting increasing numbers of adherents.
Paleofundamentalist legal concepts are usually shared either by
persons charged directly with the execution of laws or by those
persons against whom la\vs are executed but \Vho have little or no
part in their formulation. Military and police officers, as specialists
in violence, share this perspective as do laymen who have no experience in la \Vmaking either directly or by electing and scrutinizing
lawmakers.
A military officer, for example, is steeped in an authoritarian tradition. He relies extensively upon military regulations to define his
relationships with his superiors and subordinates. When he executes
his orders, he expects to rely upon law \vhich is stated and certain.
As he sees it, this la\v is a scheme necessarily developed in the past.
When he issues orders to his subordinates, he depends upon a concise
and clearly articulated framework of la\v within which these orders
are to be executed. He depersonalizes his exercises of authority by
relying upon his position for1nally established within a legal system.
The paleofundamentalist regards a legal system as an arsenal of
approved solutions. These solutions can be discovered by a lawyer or
layman. When a solution so discovered is presented to an appropriate
official, this official then applies the. solution to resolve the conflict
\vhich stimulated legal action. Lawmaking is envisaged as done in
the past by persons in positions of authority \Vho drew their ideas
from a superior system of logic or from divine inspiration.
By emphasis upon past legal doctrine as "la \V" and upon past acts
as "lawmaking," the perspective of the paleofundamentalist tends to
turn him towards action through legal institutions only when current controversies bear a close analogy to the factual conditions of
past statements of legal policy. His tendency to invoke legal processes
thus is reduced as factual analogies beco1ne difficult to 1nake. As the
ambit of la\v, as he sees it, is thus limited through his inability to
draw factual analogies, he tends to shift radically to ad hoc legislative improvisations or to rely upon nonlegal techniques in executing
policies.
Demands for highly organized and coordinated action and a high
degree of predictability of response to action are forces which attract
adherents to the paleofundamentalist position. But these demands
are never satisfied because radical or revolutionary lawmaking efforts
or recourse to nonlegal techniques for distributing or redistributing
values tend to breed the disorganization of action and unpredictability in response to action which the paleofundamentalist seeks to
avoid. Furthermore, the tendency by the paleofundamentalist to invoke legal processes only when factual analogies to past doctrinal
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conditions are clear, 1neans that legal processes are often used when
unnecessary.
Recourse to ad hoc legislation ·w hen dealing ·with a specific conflict
tends to produce either a 11.arrow statute ·which quickly becomes obsolete and is easily evaded or a general statute immaturely considered
because ai1ned a.t a single case. Establishing patterns of special treatInent by ad hoc 1nethods stimulates special demands conducive to disorganization because subgroups, often seeking values inco1npatible
to those of the 1najor group, 1nay be organized to support these deInands. General la\YS aimed at particular cases engender unpredictability in official action and complicate the task of la·w enforcement.
The co1.tp d'etat, an extre1ne 1nanifestation of the. tendency by the
paleofunda1nentalist to ad hoc lawmaking activity, does not stem in
1nost cases fro1n military disrespect for regular legal processes for
change but from presentations of ne·w facts making analogies difficult to conditions stated in constitutions, statutes or court decisions.
The tendency of the paleofunda1nentalist to rely upon nonlegal
techniques, extending fro1n moral or ethical pressures to mental and
physical coercion, blurs the standards applied in executing policies
and increases resistance to them.
Formulations of n1oral and ethical requirements tend to be personalized and provisional as contrasted with the generality and conclusiveness associated ·with "legal" prescriptions for conduct. Moral
and ethical processes are useful in supporting "legal" processes in
executing policies or in predicting or analyzing responses to these
policies. But exclusive reliance upon 1noral or ethical standards
weakens identification of the policy target with the policy maker.
Hostilities of the target also are projected against the informal group
sharing the moral or ethical standards. These groups may lack the
effective authoritarian symbols to dispel this hostility. A formally
organized community usually possesses the symbols to retain the
loyalty of its mmnbers despite their discontent with "legal" prescriptions. Coercive pressures beyond the rubric of "law" to require adherence to alleged moral or ethical norms, intensifies resistance by
the policy target.
When the p~leofuudamentalist repeats his use of legal processes
in fact situations closely analogous to fact situations stated in legal
doctrine, he may invoke law in many instances in which these conflicts are being resolved by nonlegal devices. This makes his use of
law superfluous. This phenomenon is often encountered in activity
requiring a high degree of coordination.
For example, a past statement of legal policy, rigorously and generally enforced, acts as an institutional bellwether. Courses of activity
may be set by the policy in a direction justifiable by some obvious
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requirement o:£ coordination or cooperation. Thus, hand or electrical
signals required by state statutes to be made by drivers before turning automobiles V\rould continue to be made by most motorists even
though statutes requiring these signals were repealed. The requireInent that notice be given o:£ the imposition o:£ a blockade jure belli is
superfluous because no n1odern blockade can be efficiently maintained
unless mass communications are utilized to the :fullest extent practicable to give notice to vessels ·which might enter the blockaded area.
Neofundamentali~t8~ including within their number most o:£ the
legal profession, emphasize doctrinal aspects o:£ law but believe principles o:£ action can be :found in these past policy expressions by
which current policies can be guided. Neo:fundamentalism is a conscious or unconscious acceptance o:£ central tenets o:£ the 19th century
"Historical School" that solutions to present problems and :forecasts
o:£ :future directions o:£ groV\rth stem :from principles discoverable in
human experience. Marx's theory o:£ economic determinism, Maine's
social theory o:£ history derived :from the experience o:£ oriental village communities, and Admiral Mahan's search :for princi pies o:£ sea
power affecting history are outgrowths o:£ this dominant 19th century
mode o:£ thought.
As Admiral Mahan put the matter: 48
* * * It is not * * * a vain expectation, as many think, to look
:for useful lessons in the history o:£ sailing ships as well as that
o:£ galleys. Both have their points o:£ resemblance to the modern
ship; both also have their points o:£ essential difference, which
makes it impossible to cite their experience or modes o:£ action
as tactical precedents to be :followed. But a precedent is different
:from and less valuable than a principle. The :former may be
originally :faulty, or may cease to apply through change o:£ circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature o:£
things, and, ho,vever various its applications as conditions
change, remains a standard to which action must con:£orn1 to
attain success. War has snch princi pies; their existence is detected by the study o:£ the past, "\vhich reveals them in successes
and in :failures, the same :from age to age. Conditions and weapons change; but to cope with one or successfully wield the others,
respect must be had to those constant teachings o:£ history in the
tactics o:£ the battlefield, or in those wider operations o:£ war
which are comprised under the name strategy. * * *
The legal neo:fundamentalist, while perceiving law as a matter o:£
management in accordance "\vith principle, labors under the insur48
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mountable disadvantage of lack o£ documentation and proof o£ the
history upon 'vhich he relies as a source. There is no dearth o£ law
books, but these books concentrate upon staten1ents of principle. I£
the neofundamentalist seeks to go behind these statements to verify
them, he finds himself in intellectual quicksand-and the further he
probes the deeper he sinks.49
I£ he relies upon political history, he must consider the f actual
sifting by biased reporters, intentional misstatements for political
purposes, and unconscious deficiencies in contemporary powers o£
observation o£ the facts and their relationships.
I£ he looks to reports o£ judicial decisions, he must take it for
granted all the facts were not reported. Some facts were never introduced in evidence, some seemed irrelevant to the judge who decided
the case, and others seemed unnecessary to the reporter.
I£ he looks to statutes, often .he will find no facts unless he can
find records o£ committee hearings or relevant contemporary political
histories-all subject to the limitations previously mentioned. I£ application o£ the principle cannot be verified in the past, the neofundamentalist deals with history that is partially or wholly hypothetical.
The neofundamentalist, although he seeks principles for action,
finds he must substitute for the assurance he deals with principles
actually related to past fact, faith jn the wisdom of the court or legislature formulating the principle and respect for the organ of authority by which the principle was propounded. To this extent, he is in
much the position oi the paleo fundamentalist. However, the neofundamentalist views principles as developing from a recurring flux
in human relationships (religious, economic or military, for example), relationships which are discerned and given authoritative expression as principles o£ action. This means that, unlike the paleofundamentalist, the neofundamentalist will invoke legal processes in
preference to nonlegal modes o£ executing policies or to sweeping
legislative or constitutional changes by constitutional or unconstitutional methods.
Adherents to the "Behavioristic Schools'' reject the postulate o£ the
neofundamentalist that principles o£ legal growth can be found in
history. The behaviorist considers history a mass of myth and
miranda which will conflJ~e rather than clarify th~ current administration o£ law. The behaviorist emphasizes, instead, techniques by
\vhich the mind o£ a decision maker can be opened to the relevance
and interrelationship o£ contemporary events. He does not reject
entirely the value o£ historical experience, since he uses this experi49
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ence to establish relationships between values; bet\veen values and
the institutions and resources by which values are sought; and the
impact of time, space and physical change upon these events.
The behaviorist draws consciously upon data currently developed
in the physical and social sciences and puts this material to use in his
methodology and in his policy recommendations. "Idealistic behaviorists" select, define and advocate the policy primacy of values in a
value system and advocate policies for maximum access to these
values by members of the communities with which the particular
behaviorist identifies.
The task of the legal strategist in economic \Varfare \vould be
simplified if every decision n1aker thought about "law" in the same
way. Patently, this is not the situation.
In persuading the paleofundamentalist, much emphasis must rest
upon control by the naval officer over the factual matrix of the conflict. Conformity in order to permit ready factual analogies will be
valuable.
When conformity to past practices cannot be maintained, the
paleofundamentalist may que.stion ·whether a naval officer engaged
in economic \Varfare should function as an effective lawmaker. His
position probably will be that law should be made both formally and
effectively at high policy levels.
This predisposition about ]a,vmaking is difficult to controvert. It
can be accommodated if the paleofundamentalist is kept in close contact \vith the evolving facts~ his decisional process of segmented judgment of fact thus bringing him in close contact with the perspective
of the naval executor in economic warfare.
The pa1eofundamentalist can be convinced without difficulty that
much existing legal doctrine is obsolete. He may be persuaded for
example, that statutes and treaties tend to be creatures of compromise
and may be, in a particular situation, only "legal shells" or "exhausted elements of maneuver" bet\veen former competing interest
groups within a relevant community.
The difficulty is that \Vhile the paleofundamentalist can be convinced that specific legal policies are obsolete-there being no prob-

able factual analogy currently to that stated in a legal doctrine-his
tendency then may be to shift either to nonlegal techniques or to
seek some raclica l form of legal revision. The first may result in oversight of important legal elements in economic warfare described in
this Chapter-relevant both in economic offense and defense. The
second may take more time than can be tolerated in executing economic warfare.
The approach to the paleofundamentalist should thus emphasize
conformity to past practice, obsolescence of the applicable legal doc-
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trine and minimum legal change by the naval executor in executing
economic warfare policy. The breadth or narro,vness of the administrative instructions under which the officer acts will certainly bear
upon a decision by the paleofundamentalist, the latter insisting upon
strict adherence to specific instructions but tolerating major divergences when instructions are broad.
A neofundamentalist will accept the role of a. naval administrative
maker of law but 'viii be less receptive to arguments that legal doctrines are obsolete. The neofundamentalist finds enduring statements
of principle in legal doctrine. A naval administrator will be expected
to operate within the confines of a legal system in the interest of the
coordination, balance and direction such a system may provide.
Persuasion of the neofundamentalist does not turn principally
upon control of the factual matrix by the naval executor of economic
warfare. Critical, instead, is skill of the naval executor or skill by
others in defining ,vithin the naval transaction principles of action
consistent with the values the relevant community is organized to
seek. Analysis rather than control of facts is vital.
Behaviorists will recognize the la \vmaking role of a naval officer
without difficulty. Attention to legal doctrine by these decision
makers will be directed primarily to doctrinal impact upon predispositions to action. Their methodology, permitting an accurate identification of values 'vi thin a community, the primacy of these values
and the institutions by which these values are sought, affords a basis
for predicting their decisions. Yet the great weight placed by the
behaviorist upon the influence of his decision upon contemporary
and future trends, with his intensive development of physical and
social science resources as decisional aids, also diminishes predictability. The behaviorist, nevertheless, is amenable to arguments
based upon the actual impact of the economic warfare policy and
its continuing compatability with community values.

